ABSTRACT

At the heart of both Woodrow Wilson’s scholarship and his political practice was his intent to develop a new kind of political leadership for a wholly administrative age. A reconsideration of Wilson’s ideas about political leadership and its relationship to public administration thus can provide one foundation for exploring new possibilities in political-administrative leadership relations. This reconsideration points to the value of returning to some of Wilson’s original insights regarding the importance to liberal-democratic government of national leadership development in legislative assemblies. Wilson borrowed heavily from English, French, and German ideas and practices in fashioning his reforms for the United States. The question now is whether we must do the same, or can help Wilson return the favor.
What future possibilities concerning the relationship between political leadership and administration are reasonable to consider? What governance responsibilities do political leaders have with respect to administration? Is the highly executive-centric mode of political-administrative relations in need of reconsideration? This paper responds to the workshop’s call to consider the future “possibilities of leadership” by turning to the past to take a fresh look at Woodrow Wilson’s ideas about democratic leadership and public administration.

In one of his “memoranda” laying the groundwork for a major treatise on politics he never completed, Wilson observed, "The most helpful service to the world thus awaiting the fulfillment of its visions would be an elucidation, a real elucidation, of the laws of leadership" (Link et al. 1971, 11:239). Wilson expected that a science of politics and a science of administration of the particular sort he promoted would eventually produce this “helpful service.” After more than a century, both scholars and practitioners have made great strides in understanding political and administrative leadership (see, for example, Jones 1989). The world, or at least the liberal-democratic world, nevertheless still awaits a full elucidation of the laws of leadership. A clear statement of the normative underpinnings to the relationship between political leadership and administration that will enhance constitutional self-government in a modern and post-modern age remains particularly elusive.

The value of a return to the ideas of Woodrow Wilson may not be obvious. A legion of historians, political scientists, and public administration scholars have explored his thoughts about political leadership, his ideas about administration, as well as his actions as a national and world leader. There have been both celebrations of his successes and harsh judgments of his failings. Yet this body of work on Wilson has not cemented the point that the very cornerstone of his scholarly and public service endeavor was his intent to instigate and then guide the transformation of both ideas and practices concerning the relationship between political leadership and public administration. Indeed, because he regarded modern democratic politics as largely about wielding administrative power, Wilson saw it as his principal task to develop, and practice, a new kind of leadership for an administrative age.

I thus begin with several sections that constitute an extended recounting of several key threads in Wilson’s interwoven ideas about public administration and political leadership. I proceed from there to contend that many of the institutional and relational contours of the modern administrative state in the United States, especially with respect to the roles played by elected officials and appointed or career administrators, bear the stamp, and consequences, of Wilson’s ideas and practices. I then switch to a more overtly normative analysis, presenting the lessons I believe should be drawn from a reconsideration of Wilson centering on cultivating regime leadership in representative assemblies. I conclude with brief thoughts, but primarily questions, about the relevance and transferability of the case for regime leadership beyond the U.S. context.

WHY ADMINISTRATION?

Like many young intellectuals of the late 19th century in the United States and in the English-Germanic world more generally, Wilson was distressed with what appeared to be a fundamental breakdown in the good functioning of democratic government. Following others with a reformist bent, Wilson began very early in his adulthood to search for political changes that would restore at least some of the promise of a form of government and politics that the Western world had hesitantly but inevitably embraced. Most of the American reformers who
would eventually albeit loosely coalesce under the progressive banner focused their attention on reforms that would sweep out the accumulated dirt of party politics. This was certainly a bandwagon that Wilson was happy to join. He trained the main spotlight of his reformer’s scrutiny, however, on institutional and systemic structure.

Wilson regarded the separation of powers at the heart of American constitutional design as the main culprit in creating a fragmented, responsibility-hiding political culture and set of governing practices. This line of inquiry and criticism ultimately yielded Wilson’s first major published work of scholarship, *Congressional Government*. Despite the title, Wilson’s primary concern in the book, as it had been for nearly a decade leading up to its publication in 1887, was with administration. In Wilson’s assessment, the American system of administration, which he broadly construed as the combination of policy design and policy execution, fared poorly in comparison to the English system of cabinet government and ministerial responsibility. American congressional government, with the national legislature fragmented into committee fiefdoms responsive primarily to local or sectional interests, and with no formal, direct ties between the legislature and the executive, discouraged the emergence of leaders with a national orientation, particularly with respect to effectively linking good policy design and successful implementation to serve the national interest. Although not within the pages of *Congressional Government* itself, Wilson was thus a proponent of constitutional adjustments that would allow members of Congress to serve in the president’s cabinet while holding their congressional seats, or at least to allow members of the cabinet speech and debate rights in the House and Senate.

This brief account of Wilson’s initial scholarly foray begs the question, however. Why was Wilson’s primary focus on administration, rather than on party politics, as was the case with most of his fellow reformers? To understand the motivators in Wilson’s peculiar orientation as a scholar and public intellectual, it is best to consider his aims from the perspective of his second book, *The State*.

From the earliest steps in the progression of his political thought, Wilson had accepted the reality of a modern world of new conditions and flux in the fortunes of men. On the basis of the extensive reading he undertook to prepare for writing *The State*, Wilson conceived an evolutionary ascent for democratic states characterized by the accumulation of habits and character over a long period but also the need for adaptation and adjustment to changing conditions. Such adjustments and adaptations brought with them the accumulation of social and political experience that was the basis of law. Modernity brought an unprecedented acceleration in this dynamic, with increasing demands and pressures on individuals from such forces as technological advancements, the development of large and dominating economic entities, burgeoning international migration, and rapid urbanization. Simultaneous with the very first vestiges of modernity's arrival came the embrace of the idea of mass democracy and the eventual expectation of most peoples around the world that they would have some hand in determining how society would respond to modern conditions and thus how their lives would be shaped. In the United States, the Civil War was a clear marker for the beginning of the effects of modernity. The war's end and the nation’s subsequent territorial development had also spurred the growth of an increasingly strong American nationalism and, with the completion of the settlement of western lands, the turn toward global engagement.

In Wilson's view, the self-government expected by peoples experiencing modernity, especially the citizens of the United States, could not be the democracy of the local mass meeting. It could not direct decisions on policy. This would be impossible at the national level
for national purposes and for national greatness. Instead, modern mass democracy at the level of the nation would have to be, indeed already was, virtual. Citizens participated through thought and discussion. Political leaders coaxed out of the diverse and sometimes conflicting views a common opinion or community will, and took action in response to this public opinion thus interpreted. Citizens gave their active support, or at least their assent, to such action. Sometimes citizens expressed their dissent in the selection of others to lead.

Wilson’s work on The State reflected his recognition that to understand and ultimately reform American democracy, he had to delve deeply into the past, present, and future trajectory of democracy generally and get a true fix on the peculiar nature of the modern democratic state. But the book was also a manifestation of the beginnings of his attention to administration as an object of study and teaching in its own right following the agenda he set out in his pathbreaking essay, “The Study of Administration.” Indeed, The State was based to a considerable extent on his first series of lectures on administration delivered at Johns Hopkins University.

It is his contention about the deep interlacing of democracy and administration under conditions of modernity that makes Wilson’s thinking about politics and political leadership distinctive even to this day. Wilson insisted that in the modern era most of the matters toward which citizen political thought, discussion, and scrutiny would be directed were primarily administrative. They would concern the principles and purposes underlying national policy plans and the organization and execution of those plans. Questions concerning how the polity would be constituted had largely been settled.

In Wilson's view, administrative power was the central focus of modern, integrating democratic statesmanship because administration was at the center of modern democratic politics. In the main, modern democratic politics was administration. As a political institution, administration was intimately tied to the dynamic of democratic progress he had discovered and recounted in The State. Administration was deeply implicated in democratic governance and the progressive development of modern democratic states through both its foundations "laid deep in stable principle" (Link et al. 1968, 5:370) as well as its accumulation of experience from the immediate and everyday adjustment to modern conditions as the "daily and most constant force" (Link et al. 1970, 9:25) of the state. Building on the organic state metaphors he had acquired from his reading of German source material, Wilson characterized administration as the state’s “experiencing organ” (Link et al. 1969, 7:138). The creative exercise of sovereignty by those in governing positions would depend on the adjustments and accumulated experience of administration. They would read that experience as the transformation of the basic habits of their people, to be codified in statutes, but ultimately, if necessary, in their constitutions (Thorsen 1988, 65). The organizations of administration would carry out the laws in their executive mode, but they would continue to make adjustments in response to conditions – rapidly changing in the modern age – and thus administration had "a life not resident in statutes" and was "indirectly a constant source of public law" (Link et al. 1969, 7:129, 138).

Perhaps most profoundly, as Wilson argued in both his lectures on administration and much later in several key speeches he delivered during his 1912 bid for the presidency, administration was actively engaged in defining and redefining the terms of the engagement between public and private, arguably the very essence of modern liberal democracy (Elkin 1985). As he contended in The State, the modern democratic state's aim was "to aid the individual to the fullest and best possible realization of his individuality,” and “to create the best and fairest opportunities for the individual” to flourish (Wilson 1890, 646-47). The central task
of the democratic political leader under modern conditions was to find the most effective ways to wield administrative power “for the good of ordinary people” (Link et al. 1968, 5:399). This was a major task of organizational, institutional, and systemic design and redesign, but also a very intricate task of legitimation, especially in the United States. Introducing foreign administrative methods would inevitably meet strong political resistance, so the leader faced the task of adapting those methods to American political culture and habits, as well as subtly reshaping those habits to ensure the permanent legitimacy of administratively-centered politics and government. What changed most for Wilson over time in his analysis and reform proposals to address American democracy’s modernity problem were his ideas about what kind of leader could best meet these governing challenges.

CABINET GOVERNMENT

The initial institutional focus of Wilson’s concerns about the cultivation of modern democratic leadership was on the legislature, or, to be more precise, on the cabinet. True national leadership and "the intelligent formation of opinion on the part of the nation at large" (Link et al. 1966, 1:502) would emerge, the young Wilson argued, from the reform of American governmental structures allowing a closer, more direct interconnection between the legislature and the executive through the vehicle of a cabinet with Westminster-like features. By placing several members of Congress as heads of executive departments while holding their congressional seats, these members could rise during legislative sessions and demand scrutiny of and debate about any legislation affecting the policies and operations of their departments. Further, in the midst of the deliberation and spirited public debate over the merits of legislation, those who could publicly argue their points most effectively and offer the most broadly appealing conceptions of what would best serve the effective administration of national policies would become leaders, guiding the legislature to responsible policies, instructing public opinion about the choices, and enunciating a program of national progress. Clear lines of responsibility for the consequences would be established, for these leaders would be centrally involved in both shaping policy and carrying it into effect.

Motivating Wilson's attention to the advantages he saw in cabinet government with respect to leadership, the instruction of public opinion, and responsible government were his concerns about improving policy-making and implementation in response to societal developments that were national in scope and import. Thus, he saw many of the most salutary effects of cabinet government coming in the form of increased capacity and competence in administration and, intertwined with that, improved design of the laws. "None can so well judge of the perfections or imperfections of a law as those who have to administer it" Wilson argued. Further, "the heads of the departments would also have every opportunity to defend their administration of the people's affairs against unjust censure or crippling legislation" (502).

By the early 1880s, Wilson had already crystallized in his political thought what seemed to him to be the central dilemma of modern democratic governance: how to reconcile the aspirations for self-government and mass popular participation with the reality that the emerging forces of modernity had, in a maturing nation, created a politics dominated by matters of administration. That reconciliation could only be realized, he surmised, if institutional structures encouraged the development of leaders who were experienced in, adept at, and responsible for both legislative design and policy implementation. In Congressional Government, Wilson did not stray too far from this established line of analysis, critique, and advocacy. Although he
resisted openly advocating cabinet government in the book, his fully developed diagnosis remained anchored in his argument that cabinet government, or some other structural arrangement organized around the concept of ministerial responsibility, would generate a number of beneficial effects in policy design and policy management. Policy design would improve because, first, it would be influenced by the presence and extensive legislative participation of experienced administrators, and second, administrative heads would seek to influence legislation to produce policy that could be effectively administered. As a result of these first two effects, public debate would be centered on the pressing public problems the nation faced and what policies and programs would best address them.

In parallel, policy management would improve because heads of departments would seek to demonstrate their administrative prowess and successes in order to gain or sustain their positions of leadership. Further, the operation of the executive departments would be subject to extensive scrutiny in open public debate, and the legislature would be more effectively organized to exercise its oversight function in a responsible manner. Legislators would, moreover, no longer have the incentive to interfere with the personnel and spending decisions of executive agencies since they could no longer hide such efforts behind the closed doors of standing committee meetings. A nonpartisan civil service could be fully put in place as a result, and department heads would be better able to improve administrative effectiveness as a means of maintaining their positions of power. Finally, policy management would improve because policy would be designed better in the first place and thus more easily administered.

The true innovation in his thinking Wilson introduced in *Congressional Government*, emerged from his more overt attention to the executive. He broached questions about the proper training, preparation, and experience of administrators, including the president. His attention to the institutional standing and administrative preparation of the president rests in the context of his more general concern for setting national administration on a firmer footing by bringing the executive and legislative realms into a relationship of greater cooperation and trust, which was in marked contrast to the sharply antagonistic relations between department heads and Congress he had observed. "The relations existing between Congress and the departments must be fatally demoralizing to both. . . . The departments may be excused for that attitude of hostility which they sometimes assume towards Congress, . . . [for] Congress cannot control the officers of the executive without disgracing them. Its only whip is investigation, semi-judicial examination into corners suspected to be dirty" (Wilson 1981, 183).

Of course, for Wilson the problems of administrative-legislative antagonism were manifestations of a central design flaw: the public through its representatives ultimately could not control public policy and thus could not attend to the pressing societal demands of modernity. Constitutional structure had produced "hide-and-seek vagaries of authority . . . , roundabout paths which legislative and executive responsibility are permitted to take" (184) and "the piecing of authority, the cutting of it up into small bits" (185). Reversing the equation of the original constitutional design by centralizing authority and policy control in a new kind of national legislator-executive, Wilson argued, would not just lead to greater competence and policy success, it would generate greater confidence and trust in the system. Americans should not fear power, Wilson insisted, but should embrace it along with clearly defined accountability: "Power and strict accountability for its use are the essential elements of good government. A sense of highest responsibility, a dignifying and elevating sense of being trusted, together with a consciousness of being in an official station so conspicuous that no faithful discharge of duty can
go unacknowledged and unrewarded, and no breach of trust undiscovered and unpunished, these are the influences, the only influences which foster practical, energetic, and trustworthy statesmanship" (187, emphasis in original).

The leadership model that Wilson fashioned in his work leading up to and including the publication of *Congressional Government* combined administrative expertise and experience with the skills to lead a legislature in discussion and debate toward designing good public policy. This new kind of leader also possessed organizational leadership capacity to ensure that the administrative department he headed carried out new policy honestly, efficiently, and expeditiously. The confidence and integrity of a small number of legislator-executives who together formed the cabinet, or something structurally like it within American constitutional restrictions, were such that each could accept ultimate responsibility for his particular policy program, resigning from the cabinet should the program suffer some significant defeat in Congress, whether the result of failures in policy design or policy management. With such leadership of skill, responsibility, and integrity emanating from a small group of nationally-oriented legislator-administrators, it is no wonder Wilson had little to say early on about the presidency.

Perhaps the most important realization to take away from a recounting of Wilson's analysis in *Congressional Government* is how much he stressed the close ties between administrative success and competent legislative craftsmanship. Not only did Wilson argue that most policy issues under Congress's purview were administrative in concept and effect and that statutory construction had to take into account the requisites for successful policy execution, he also signaled that the design of administration and management structures were themselves a critical object of national policy development. Wilson thus contended that the organization, or more accurately the reorganization, of Congress's internal practices was essential to improving American national governance in the modern age. An understanding and refashioning of the legislative process was crucial to effective congressional oversight and broader public scrutiny of administration. This in turn was critical to the development of neutral administrative competence and the increased cultivation of managerial capacities at the national level.

The reform problem, as Wilson initially framed it, was how to deal with a "normal" politics (that is, one not shaped by regime founding, internal crisis, or imminent external threat) that had become almost exclusively administrative in character. This was also the question of how to harness the vast potential of administrative power. The American constitutional system did not lend itself to coping with modern conditions effectively. The principal barrier was the separation of powers, which fostered fragmentation, irresponsibility, and an absence of integrating leadership. Thus Wilson sought to develop reforms to promote effective, responsible political leadership that would tie popular judgment to administrative politics and the harnessing of administrative power. Administration would be improved as a result, and democratic practice would be transformed.

**FROM LEGISLATIVE TO PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP**

The further development of Wilson’s thinking about political leadership, and his eventual turn away from the legislature and cabinet and toward the presidency as the proper institutional home for this integrating leadership materialized from his immersion in the study of the nature of the modern democratic state – reflected, again, most prominently in *The State* – and from his continued wrestling with the unyielding obstacles American constitutional structure placed in the
path of cabinet government. Over the course of the ensuing 10 years, Wilson extended and embellished his leadership conception while preserving its essence and incorporating it into a substantial number of his most prominent lectures and public addresses, particularly during the 1890s. Throughout this period, the legislature remained the focal point of Wilson's public pronouncements about leadership.

In his notes for his lectures on constitutional government in 1898, Wilson declared that "Real leaders must pick themselves out; and the process of self-selection cannot be carried on except upon some public forum where men may prove themselves with regard to the principal function they are called upon to perform." Again, the premier forum for demonstrating leadership was the legislature: "Wherever we look, outside the field of international politics, we find the Legislature the only real forum of selection to leadership in the existing world of politics, – the only place where wisdom in affairs is publicly proved by service." A specific legislative organization was also central to fostering this leadership: "We also find that only the 'parliamentary' system, whereby both functions of government [legislative and administrative] are entrusted to the legislative leaders, makes leadership distinct, effective, responsible" (Link et al. 1971, 11:14, emphasis in original).

At the core of the theory of democratic political leadership Wilson crafted with legislative leaders in mind was what he called interpretation. Wilson argued that a true democratic statesman exercising leadership as interpretation had to be from and of the people. By talent and ambition, however, and especially by imagination and a special ability to sense popular thought, leaders rose above the common folk. Only merit and capacity, not class status or privilege, should play a role in the identification of leaders. "The real test," declared Wilson, of democracy's "excellence as a form of government is the training, the opportunities, the authority, the rewards which its constitutional arrangements afford those who seek to lead it faithfully and well. It does not get the full profit of its own characteristic principles and ideals unless it use the best men in it, without regard to their blood or breeding" (Link et al. 1972, 12:179). Wilson also understood the democratic leader as not standing aloof or above the people but in their midst, at the center of the rough and sometimes inchoate discussion of politics. What the leader worked with at the center of political society were the myriad habits and sentiments, thoughts and motives, of citizens. This is what the leader interpreted, identifying the commonalities and unities, giving voice to the common interest and purpose, and thus articulating public opinion. Wilson saw this as a subtle yet powerful process that required careful explication.

The true work of leaders, however, was action, not thought. To get to action, leaders worked with "the firm and progressive" popular thought and not the "momentary and whimsical" popular mood; that is what in part distinguished true leaders from demagogues. Thus, interpretation was the enterprise of reading the common thought in order to "test and calculate very circumspectly the preparation of the nation for the next move in the progress of politics" (Link et al. 1969, 6:659). Wilson also stressed in his conception of leadership that democratic statesmen worked with the masses, not with individuals. They had to advance ideas that were simple and easily absorbed; they had to work not through dissemination of information but through persuasion and gaining the confidence of large numbers. Leadership as interpretation did not mean that leaders told citizens what to think. Instead, the leaders explained to the citizens what they would think, based on their own inclinations and partial thoughts, if only they had the time and energy to stop and contemplate fully the common interest and the general good.
Furthermore, popular leadership did not follow the straight line of logic but instead the more convoluted path of habit and sentiment, "the actual windings of the channel" (662). Successful leadership, Wilson concluded, was a matter not of antagonism but of sympathy, "the impulse of a profound sympathy with those whom he leads, – a sympathy which is insight, – an insight which is of the heart rather than the intellect" (666, emphasis in original). Although circumstances and conditions, including variations across regimes, would demand leaders of varying characteristics, there were common elements, including sensitivity, conceptual and interpretive prowess, initiative, and "subtle persistency" (Link et al. 1972, 12:365).

Finally, constraints on the leader were a crucial component of Wilson's conception of democratic statesmanship (Thorsen 1988, 232). "One dare not be so individual in social activity as in art, e.g., dare not outrun or shock the common habit; dare not innovate. Such is not the task of leadership" (Link et al. 1968, 5:59, emphasis in original). Similarly, in The State Wilson warned that the "habit of the nation" was a stubborn and sometimes volatile material that would resist a leader who sought to push it too far (Wilson 1890, 661-62). In "Leaders of Men," the public talk he delivered more frequently than any other, Wilson asserted that the political leader "must perceive the direction of the nation's permanent forces, and must feel the speed of their operation. There is initiative here, but not novelty. There are old thoughts, but a progressive application of them" (Link et al. 1969, 6:660, emphasis in original).

Summarizing his thinking on the matter a decade later, Wilson concluded, "The problem of every government is leadership: the choice and control of statesmen and the scope that shall be given to their originative part in affairs; and for democracy it is a problem of peculiar difficulty" (Link et al. 1972, 12:178). Democracy's problem was "to control its leaders and yet not hamper or humiliate them; to make them its servants and yet give them leave to be masters too, not in name merely but in fact, of the policy of a great nation" (179).

Wilson, it is important to stress, was no political idealist and no ivory tower theoretician. He is counted among the "realists" at work attempting to influence American debates about governance in the early twentieth century (see Seidelman 1985). Wilson believed in particular that theory ought to follow observation and experience rather the other way around. Although his recognition of the forces of modernity had made him sensitive to the challenges democracies faced in the possibilities of international engagement, it was not until he saw the emergence of a more expansionist American foreign policy at the very end of the 19th century that he began seriously to rethink the proper foundation for his conception of modern democratic leadership, with its focus on harnessing administrative power.

It is quite telling that “the field of international politics” is the exception Wilson notes to his claim that in democracies the legislature is the institutional proving ground for responsible national leadership. By the fall of 1898, Wilson arrived at the "singular conclusion that the President, who is elected by the whole people, is not a leader in the vital matters" of the nation (Link et al. 1971, 11:70). Yet he also emphasized that with the nation's new global reach, there was an expressed need for uniting "those who plan and those who execute" in order that "there may be efficiency and responsibility" (71). The search for such an arrangement of efficiency and responsibility in the face of the American arrival on the world stage led Wilson to traverse the institutional boundary in his thinking about democratic statesmanship and embrace the presidents as the center of national leadership.

What would define their leadership as truly modern democratic statesmanship? "Leadership eludes analysis," Wilson contended in notes prepared in 1902. "It is only by the
action of leading minds that the organic will of a community is stirred to the exercise of either
generative purpose or guiding control in affairs." He defined leadership as "the practicable
formulation of action, and the successful arousal and guidance of motive in social development"
(Link et al. 1972, 12:365). Similarly, he characterized statesmanship as "the guidance of the
opinion and purpose of a nation in the field of political action" (Link et al. 1973, 15:33).

Because he regarded the "field of political action" as almost exclusively administrative,
Wilson had to devise an understanding of the role of the president that would be an adequate
substitute for integrating the policy design and policy execution functions, institutionally
separated in the American constitutional system, which he originally saw as being undertaken by
a cabinet of legislator-administrators. Wilson presented that conception of integrating leadership,
anchored in the presidency, in his final major work of scholarship, _Constitutional Government_.
The volume stands as a remarkable synthesis of Wilson's political thought up to that time,
leavened by what he characterized as a "fresh point of view" and a "fresh analysis of the
character and operation of constitutional government" (Wilson 1908, v).

Wilson's presentation of the presidency as the proper institutional home for integrating
national leadership was not a simple shift of allegiance or orientation from his long embrace of
the responsible minister. Indeed, his analysis relied on the same essential orientation as that
found in _The State_. Fundamental to Wilson's fresh point of view and analysis was an
understanding of the nature of the new, modern American citizen. No longer was the citizen
principally a critical spectator of national debates in Congress led by those responsible ministers.
Now, citizens were heavily preoccupied with the demands of modern life, particularly "the
pursuit of economic objectives. This implied that the new citizen was less interested in listening
and more ready to ask for, or even to pressure the government for, help in the realization of
material interests" (Thorsen 1988, 200). By virtue of the principles, character, habits, and
developmental circumstances of the polity, as embodied in the Constitution, however, the
American democratic state was directed toward "the growth and development of national
power." One of the national "representative institutions" had to bring the energies directed
toward this national development to "self-consciousness" (204).

Consistent with his longstanding critique, Wilson did not find the Congress capable of
fulfilling that need. Hampered by localism and bossism and by growing public distrust, neither
the states nor the parties could fill the need. The "revolution of communications" and the
"revolution in foreign affairs" provided the president the upper hand in becoming "the focus of
national unity" (Thorsen 1988, 207). More important, the presidency embodied institutionally –
and the president embodied personally – both the legitimacy of government conferred by popular
rule through universal suffrage and the efficiency of the executive at the head of a national
system of administration. As Wilson argued, "The object of constitutional government is to bring
the active, planning part of government into accord with the prevailing popular thought and need,
and thus make it an impartial instrument of symmetrical national development" (Wilson 1908,
14). The president embodied this accord, thus standing as a bridge to Congress, party,
administration, and nation by "being spokesman for the real sentiment and purpose of the
country," "giving direction to opinion," and "giving the country at once the information and the
statements of policy which will enable it to form its judgments alike of parties and of men" (68).

The president could legitimately watch over administration, since he had daily contact
with it and presumably at least some experience in it. But the president ought not actually do
much administering; he should instead give voice to public opinion regarding the central matters
of policy and administration facing the nation: "But we can safely predict that as the multitude of
the President's duties increases, as it must with the growth and widening activities of the nation
itself, the incumbents of the great office will more and more come to feel that they are
administering it in its truest purpose and with greatest effect by regarding themselves as less and
less executive officers and more and more directors of affairs and leaders of the nation, – men of
counsel and of the sort of action that makes for enlightenment" (81). Administration as a distinct
institution could then operate with reasonable autonomy, since those "who administer the law
and direct the policy of the nation in its field of action shall be strictly subject to the laws, must
observe the prescribed methods and understandings of the system very precisely; but it is by no
means a necessary inference that they shall be in leading strings and shall be reduced to be the
mere ministerial agents of a representative assembly" (15). With such standing, administration
could fulfill its important roles in the regime, including shaping the law through the fusion of its
experience with presidential leadership of policymaking.

In his final scholarly exposition, then, Wilson made the case for the president as the
political leader best fit to ensure that administration would fulfill the purpose that he had
projected for it in the democratic state's most mature stage of development. That purpose, as he
stated in his lectures on administration, was one of "serving the State, not the law-making body
in the State, and possessing a life not resident in statutes." It would be through the harmonizing,
integrating effect of presidential leadership that the "administrative organs of the Community"
would become "organically whole, vigorous, and full of purpose" (Link et al. 1969, 7:129).

POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM

Wilson’s thinking about political leadership and its relationship to administration was not
limited to considering the institutional locus and structure of political leadership. Wilson also
explored extensively the requisites of good administrative structure, which formed the
centerpiece of his lectures on administration. Wilson’s ideas in this regard ranged widely,
including prescriptions for the political-administrative structure of cities (see Cook 2007b). I
limit my attention here, however, to Wilson’s contentions about the importance of political and
administrative integration to ensure the proper relations between political leaders and
administration. Exploring Wilson’s ideas in this regard takes us briefly into the dreaded territory
of the politics-administration dichotomy.

Separating administration from politics may be the only substantive idea that most public
administration scholars and practitioners reflexively associate with Wilson. It is important to
realize that in his invocation of the separation idea, Wilson was thinking both empirically and
normatively, but with much greater emphasis on the latter. Hence, the frequent dismissals of
Wilson's advocacy of the separation as inconsistent with the reality of how government and
politics actually works (see, for example, the scholarship assessed in Frederickson and Smith
2003, ch. 3) are rather beside the point. Certainly, Wilson's historical-comparative research
suggested to him that separating administration from political manipulation but not legitimate
political control was the way administration was organized and related to political authority in
some contemporary nation-states – or at least the way it might be on sufficiently close
examination. More importantly, however, such separation was the way Wilson thought
administration might become ordered and connected to political authority as a result of the
discoveries that would come from the emerging new science of administration, which would
reveal what structures and practices were alike across all types of regimes.
Wilson thus advanced a two-part normative argument about separating administration from politics and cultivating neutral competence. First, many of the good structures and practices to be discovered or devised by administrative science were businesslike in the obvious sense that they should be deployed to make individual programs, and the government generally, run well, irrespective of the prevailing philosophy that set the goals for the programs and the government. Second, for good structures and practices to flourish, it is clearly imperative that private interest and partisan manipulation and interference of administrative practices be kept to a minimum. This would allow administration at any level of government, but especially at the national level, to professionalize, to develop the necessary educational and training regimens, vital technical expertise, and practical experience in the face of an increasingly complex industrial, commercial, and social reality. Continuing partisan control of most administrative offices, especially by maintaining them as elective offices, would clearly deter those who desired professional status and sought to employ their expertise – and the experience that would require many years to accumulate – for public aims. Even more important, minimizing "political" interference would make administration more demonstrably useful in carrying out the law efficiently and effectively. More forcefully still, administration relatively free of short-term, partisan political interference could better learn from the conditions of society what immediate adjustments (through ordinance and regulation) and more formal and permanent adjustments (through law and even constitutional change) would be necessary to maintain the integrity and long-run health of the regime.

Both these facets of Wilson's thinking reflected a political strategy: to legitimate the emergence of a more well-defined, powerful, far-reaching administrative system employing new kinds of personnel and practices, all of which were foreign to American political culture and practices and the prevailing political experience of most American citizens. The idea of a recognizable separation of political and administrative offices was thus part of Wilson's enterprise to bring about a new conception of the proper relationship between public opinion and administrative power. Wilson sought to convince Americans that administration properly situated with respect to political authority would be subject to the control of political leaders who could interpret public opinion, read the popular thought and translate it into action, and thus harness administrative power to serve the aspirations of the people and the ends of the state. This was a subtle and difficult calibration for Wilson to try to make.

The calibration Wilson sought required him to propose particular features of the design of an administrative system that would reinforce the legitimacy of the new, expanded, and essential use of administrative power. System design and administrative structures of a particular sort would keep administration in its proper place, organically integrated so that its value – the power of organization, coordination, and adjustment – could be fully exploited, while also being restrained so that it did not stray from its appropriate role and threaten to oppress or dominate the body politic. Restraint was also appropriate to ensure that administration would not go beyond its institutional capacity and become dysfunctional and ineffectual in its special role. As much as domination, this too could threaten the health of the body politic and perhaps even the existence of the regime in the long run.

At the heart of Wilson’s structural vision were two closely intertwined ideas: political concentration and vertical administrative integration. By the political concentration Wilson meant the supervision of administration at all levels of government by national political leaders. This supervision was only to be “prudential” (Link et al. 1969, 7:385). Neither national political
leaders nor national administrative leaders were to preside over administration at other levels. They were, however, to be empowered to coax, guide, or induce administrative action that was consistent with national policy, which, after all, was the expression in political action of the purposes and aspirations of the national polity. Wilson's principal concern in his pursuit of specific designs for vertical administrative integration and political concentration was regime adjustment. That is, he sought ways to structure government and the administration of the people's affairs to balance the forces of unity and differentiation, which were energized by the conditions of modernity. His overall guide was the aim of organic wholeness, reflecting in institutional design and organizational structure the life of the state. He tried to envision ways to organize political authority and arrange and distribute administrative power in order to realize the organic wholeness he considered the object of the developmental progression of the modern democratic state, necessary for the survival and progress of a liberal democracy in the modern world. Wilson intended his designs, structures, and methods to foster greater political responsibility among public officials and thus make government more responsive – responsive in a more appropriate way – to public opinion.

Wilson saw the organic wholeness and integration he espoused as applying within the institutional structure of the various levels of government – and even within individual administrative organizations – as well as across the entire multi-level system. With respect to the organization of administration at the national level, this did mean a separation of purely political offices and administrative "instrumentalities" because national organic integration was a political task requiring parties to articulate policy principles around which a majority – and majority public opinion – would cohere. The separated components were nevertheless directly and intimately linked by the greater political purposes of regime development and progress toward national unity and national power underlying the design.

What shaped in considerable part Wilson's emphasis on concentrating political authority over administration in a relatively small body of officials was his recognition of the challenge of administrative and political coordination. Anticipating Harold Seidman's signature work on federal executive structure and political management by more than eighty years, Wilson argued that coordination was the principal source of questions about administrative organization at the central government level. He saw coordination as a particularly complex challenge, involving questions about the extent of the authority held by the head of state "over administration as a whole" as well the "organic (collegiate) union" of functions across several executive departments through a "superintending . . . council" (Link et al. 1969, 7:394). These questions led Wilson to distinguish between "political (i.e., responsible ministerial)" integration and administrative integration. The former concerned the "political life and choice of society as a whole," while the latter concerned administration "as a business." The two were "separate (and yet united) phases" of government because government was "not merely a business" (396).

Somewhat in contrast to Seidman (see Seidman and Gilmour 1986, 225), Wilson saw coordination as necessarily taking place at the top because that was where the requisite organic integration and wholeness could be achieved. Yet both Wilson and Seidman saw coordination in systemic terms, stretching across levels of government and dependent principally on proper political leadership. Political leaders would "identify and agree on . . . national goals and priorities and . . . design programs to accomplish them" (Seidman and Gilmour 1986, 245). For Wilson, this was the core responsibility of statesmanship in an administrative age. The relationship of political leaders to the instrumental aspect of administration was "merely
presidential and devoted exclusively to the origination and adaptation of policy . . . and dealing directly with all [questions] of legislation." Leaders would bear exclusive political responsibility for these lawmaking and policy-making endeavors, but because they were in frequent contact with instrumental administration their goals, priorities, and program designs would be guided "by the officials of the permanent technical service" (Link et al. 1969, 7:396).

From the standpoint of the organizational structure of administration and management, what Wilson labeled "non-political" governmental functions under the purview of public managers and front-line workers covered a considerable range. This "double" function of the nonpolitical, business side of administration covered the "actual detailed execution of law, [the] actual performance of the business of the State" as well as "oversight or assistance directed . . . toward" individuals or other levels of government (397). This latter oversight or assistance concerned both supervision of an authoritative sort – controlling, limiting, sanctioning, or commanding individuals or other levels of government – and supervision of a "suggestive" sort, which entailed providing information or expert advice.

Wilson's broad view was that the coordination necessary for good administration and management in a modern democratic state required an organizational structure at the central level of government with a small body of political leaders at the top, who together would make the hard choices about goals, priorities, and programs. Separate but closely linked was a substantial administrative apparatus proper, encompassing both planning and more strictly executing functions, especially at lower levels of government, integrated into an overall system that reinforced fidelity to national policy. Especially at the national level, this administrative infrastructure would be staffed by technical experts and management specialists, who would operate with considerable autonomy and discretion, giving the structure "an independent intelligence of its own" (396).

Wilson’s vigorous promotion of vertical administrative integration suggests a strong taste for hierarchy in the ordering of government, which is precisely the focus of Vincent Ostrom’s critique (Ostrom 1987). Yet Wilson was decidedly not doctrinaire in his reform posture. His preference for the English cabinet system indicates a more eclectic orientation to his search for arrangements in the relations between political leadership and administration that would best serve the American polity in the face of modernity. This is fully reflected in his promotion of a science of administration that was primarily historical and comparative. Wilson recognized that, to use Daniel Elazar’s (1997) typology, he was working within a “covenant or matrix” system, but he sought to find the common elements, and what we would today call best practices, that might safely be imported from both “hierarchical,” and “center-periphery” or “organic” systems.

POLITICAL LEADERSHIP, ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE, AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Much of public management theory and practice over the past two decades has been a response to the call from elected officials, following particular ideological agendas and claiming mandates from their national electorates, for administrative reforms that would increase the accountability of administrative leaders for government performance. This is what the New Public Management seems to have been about, at least in part. Given this context, it is appropriate to consider several of the specific structural reforms and practices Wilson promoted, and the concerns about accountability that undergirded them. Again, it is important to keep in mind that Wilson saw his broader, systemic reform endeavor as fundamentally about
responsibility and accountability because he saw as the principal weakness of the American separation of powers design that it fractured and obscured the responsibility of political leaders for responding to citizen demands and needs in the face of modern conditions.

Wilson's promotion of three reforms in particular – the short ballot and the commission form of government at the municipal level, and his distillation of the concept of "definite law" – all revolved around his central aim of fixing clearly responsibility for policy design and policy action in a relatively small body of political leaders. With respect to the short ballot and commission government, Wilson argued that public opinion could better control administration at the local level through these reforms for two reasons. First, citizens could concentrate the limited time and energy they had available for scrutinizing government performance on the few officials whose positions were filled by election (short ballot), or better yet, on the small body of elected officials that both designed and enacted local ordinances and oversaw their implementation (commission government). Second, both structural reforms would take control of administration out of the hands of political party machines. Wilson expressed a back-handed admiration for political machines because of the political and administrative integration they achieved through their control of elections and patronage. Unfortunately, the integrating mechanism of the party machine stood outside of government, thus placing policy design and implementation decisions beyond the scrutiny and control of citizens at large, and placing administration under the control of partial interests who could then use government for their own gain. For Wilson, then, the short ballot and commission government were reforms that would make American government, and more specifically administration, more democratic. Administrative experts, who would bring many new techniques and practices into the operations of government, would be under the direct control of a body of political leaders small enough for citizens to assess and control through elections. Citizens thus could hold these officials directly accountable for the failures, and credit them for the successes, of policy design and policy execution.

Wilson's developed his concept of "definite law" as a way to reinforce the responsibility-fixing effects of political and administrative structural reforms. By "definite law" Wilson meant law that spelled out very specifically right or wrong conduct. He insisted that those individuals who engaged in any prohibited conduct be held personally to account for such actions and, if necessary, punished. He promoted it primarily in the context of his public stand on monopolies, trusts, and business regulation, insisting on the need to fix individual responsibility for corporate or financial misdeeds, thus reinforcing his more longstanding arguments about the need to fix individual responsibility for policy making and administrative action. In keeping with his views about administration as the "experiencing organ" of the state, he stressed that definite law should be based not on some abstract theory of economic design or governmental structure but on administrative experience, both private and public. Two especially closely interrelated dimensions of Wilson's idea of definite law – personalization and transparency – further reveal Wilson's thinking about the accountability facet of administrative organization and practice.

Wilson contended that whatever authority and accompanying responsibility was vested in an administrative organization, or in the administrative system as a whole, that authority and responsibility should not be diffuse or hidden. It should be concentrated, transparent, and tied to the incumbent officeholder. In short, it should be personalized. In a 1910 gubernatorial campaign speech, Wilson observed, "Government, gentlemen, is personal, it is not impersonal." He went on to characterize government as "intensely personal," and he insisted it was time "to get away
from the idea that parties are intended for the dispersion of responsibility, to come around to the idea that parties are intended for the support of responsible representatives " (Link et al. 1976, 21:533; see also 501).

To the argument that for the American people to have confidence in their government and its exercise of the great modern power of administration those who were responsible for wielding that power had to be relatively few in number, readily identifiable as individual officeholders, and relatively easy to monitor, Wilson added with his idea of definite law the additional requirement that behavioral consequences be simply and clearly spelled out. This would seem to apply principally to political leaders, but by logical extension it would also apply to those who held office by appointment, to the extent that they exercised administrative power. Transparency and personalization in administrative structure would thus create the incentive environment within which the private interests and ambitions of public officials would fuse with their sense of the public good to enable them to gain the trust of their fellow citizens.

With his idea of definite law, Wilson sought to support the essentials of administrative design with complementary policy design, such that the same principles of responsibility and transparency should apply to private actors to the that extent their behavior was regulated by law. In Wilson’s eyes, what was fundamentally at stake in the design of policy and administration on the basis of transparency and personal responsibility was the maintenance of democratic control through structures of accountability, appropriately conceived. Wilson's idea of definite law was, then, a distinctive manifestation of his core notion that good governance required a close linkage between lawmaking and administration – an interlocking of the two, achieved primarily through political leadership but also through the conception and design of good policy, and the right structures for carrying policy into effect.

POLITICAL-ADMINISTRATIVE RELATIONS AFTER WILSON

In his own time, Wilson was widely regarded by his opponents as a political chameleon (see, for example, Skowronek 1997, 453-55, 458-59). He has been both praised and denounced by scholars for both adhering to and departing from his expressed governing principles. One could never expect a political leader perfectly to align governing action with stated ideals, especially one with a theoretical framework and reform agenda as elaborate as Wilson’s. To a remarkable degree, however, Wilson followed in practice many of the ideas he articulated as a scholar and reformer. Indeed, in the case of his successive conceptions of the proper institutional locus of national political leadership, Wilson attempted to follow both. He began his first presidential term with at least intimations of an aim to preside over a cabinet that would operate as the “superintending council,” achieving a “collegiate union” or organic integration of functions across the executive departments of the federal government. He abandoned the effort several months into his first term, however, in favor of his presidential leadership model articulated in Constitutional Government. Yet he never completely renounced his embrace of the cabinet government mode, for it briefly re-emerged late in his presidency in the guise of his informal “war cabinet,” which operated in way that made "management of the war effort . . . essentially a collective enterprise" (Thompson 2002, 168), albeit closely held within the executive branch.

Even under his president-centered leadership approach, Wilson demonstrated in his governing practices considerable affinity for his ideas about systemic administrative structure, political concentration, and policy coordination. He sought a number of improvements in
national fiscal policy design, planning, and coordination (Lynch and Rahimi 1984), and in the extension and systemization of intergovernmental fiscal relations (Walker and Plant 1984). As governor of New Jersey, Wilson operationalized his idea of “definite law” as the expression by lawmakers of policy principles that would be detailed enough to guide administration in its application of the law, and yet general enough to allow the balancing of equity and practicality in case-by-case assessments and determinations. He also initially insisted on adherence to definite law as policy principle in his call for additional anti-trust control and trade regulation, when he urged Congress to find "a further and more explicit legislative definition of the policy and meaning of the existing antitrust law" (Link et al. 1979, 29:156-57).

It is in connection with several significant deviations between Wilson’s ideals and reforms aims and his governing practices that the problematic nature of his conceptual scheme for transforming the relationship between political leadership and administration comes to the fore. These deviations include his extensive use of patronage in administrative appointments, which, although it gave him considerable trouble because of its obvious departure from his expressed support for continued civil service reform, was meant to solidify the binding nature of presidential leadership by making him the leader of his party in Congress. The consequence, however, was the further splintering rather than concentration of political authority over administration. Wilson’s efforts with respect to intergovernmental relations had a similar consequence through the introduction of the single-state-agency mandate, which created "vertical functional autocracies" (Seidman and Gilmour 1986, 197) that resulted in “picket-fence federalism” characterized by administrative entities relatively resistant to high-level coordination and authoritative political control. The emergence of these entities also represented the rise of bureaucratic power of the sort that in both theory and practice Wilson took particular pains to insist would not materialize under his designs for political-administrative relations.

Further deviations include his ultimate abandonment of his definite law principle during the struggle over the Clayton Act. Instead, Wilson accepted broad, shallow, and vague legislative grants of discretionary authority to administrative agencies, as well as the creation of administrative units outside the close presidential orbit of the departmental structure. Both departures occurred in conjunction with the creation of the Federal Trade Commission, which was placed under much greater congressional supervision and control. The creation of the Federal Reserve was an even more substantial departure from the idea of administrative integration and concentrated political authority.

There is, finally, his retreat to more traditional constitutional understandings of presidential authority and responsibility as the main pillar of this leadership posture during American involvement in World War I. He sought not to bridge policy design and policy execution in the mobilization effort and prosecution of the war, but to centralize it in the presidency, demanding legislative blank checks from Congress, and abandoning almost wholesale the “common counsel” he had frequently called for in both his theory and his political rhetoric.

It is not, however, Wilson’s departures in practice from his ideas and reform aims per se that proved troubling. In the face of uncontrollable events and a political regime with an increasing number and diversity of autonomous political actors, any political leader, presidents in particular, would make some adjustments in their plans that would move them away from some pure expression in action of their fundamental principles and ideals. This is especially true of Wilson, who combined in his conception of political leadership a reliance on experience and an
immersion in the commotion of political thought and interaction to draw out of it the common denominator around which a majority could form with a very Burkean understanding of conservatism as careful, progressive adaptation to changing conditions. Neither of these components of his idea of political leadership needed much adjustment even after Wilson took up the progressive cause. What makes the development of political-administrative relations after Wilson so remarkable, instead, is how great the departures are from what he envisioned and how much these departures can be traced to his reliance on the very model of political-administrative leadership, centered in the presidency that he consciously devised out of such a careful reconsideration of his reform premises. It is a model that Wilson firmly embraced, but one that neither he nor any of his successors could sustain in practice over the long haul.

This is not to deny the extent of the impact, and accomplishments, emanating from Wilson’s reform enterprise. In the Wilson administration's efforts at administrative capacity-building, one can readily see the embryonic structure of the national executive establishment that came fully into being by the end of World War II and has only grown in complexity and reach since then. It is a combination of executive departments, independent, single-headed agencies under direct presidential control, independent commissions with a more arm's length relationship to the president, and the extensive intermingling of public and private organizations and expertise. Wilson thus led the way toward significant policy and administrative innovation, and he secured a remarkable level of national political legitimacy for the policy and administrative advances he helped bring about.

In addition, from the perspective of political-administrative relations, one must consider the most prominent of Wilson's administrative and managerial actions as president a notable triumph. While making clear a concern for consistency with his primary policy agenda, Wilson granted substantial discretion and autonomy to his administrators and managers, allowing them to focus on solving substantive problems as they saw them and developing initiatives grounded in their experience and expertise. Identifiable improvements in national administration and in the life of American citizens ultimately followed.

Nevertheless, the failures of Wilson's theory and practice lie in his turn away from his original diagnosis and accompanying remedy centered on cabinet government. In the American case, at least, there are certainly serious questions about how a small body of truly national political leaders can govern successfully by subordinating their ambitions to a collective endeavor while still facing personal accountability for the governing results in their areas of responsibility. There is at least some evidence, however, both in Wilson's wartime practices and in the examples of several other presidents, to indicate that effective governance, especially coordinated, collectively responsible governance, without the entire burden resting on the shoulders of one person, even in the fragmented, competitive, interest-driven system of American politics. The source of the problematic consequences of Wilson's actions is thus rooted in his decision to vest responsibility for the leadership and legitimacy needed to ensure the effective wielding of administrative power solely in the presidency. It is an impossible task of administrative integration, coordination of policy and administration, and interpretive statesmanship for one official, no matter how well supported by the Constitution or the expression of national sentiment.

Wilson was correct that his aims for the reconstitution of the regime centering on administration required effective national leadership and, through it, the legitimation of the modern power of administration. In shifting the locus of leadership in his scheme from a cabinet
of public executives and responsible ministers to the president and in defining presidential leadership primarily in rhetorical terms, Wilson disconnected the interpretive leadership component of his reform design from the other key interlocking elements. In his original conception, interpretive statesmen were to be both legislators and executives, and they were to have intimate knowledge of, direct involvement in, and responsibility for policy designs, administrative plans, and their successful execution. Policy both more clearly and more definitely designed, and thus more effectively executed, was to be the result. It was also this package of interconnected elements that was to provide the systemic or global legitimacy for both the "large powers and unhampered discretion" (Wilson, 1887, 213) that administrators were to exercise and for the purpose-creating actions that were inevitably to follow. Wilson in fact envisioned the package of elements as essential to anchoring the way in which a modern, fully national democracy could take advantage of the purpose-refining feature of administrative power.

By also decoupling almost completely the presidency from the executive dimension of administration, Wilson set in motion in the U.S. the severing of administrative structure and the work of public administrators, at all levels in the national system but especially at the national level, from his integrated regime development enterprise aimed at unified national progress. Several further consequences bearing on both the conception and practice of American national governance, and the relationship between political leadership and leadership in public management, are evident.

First, the heads of major administrative departments – those individuals who, operating within a cabinet, Wilson originally envisioned as being responsible for the political concentration and administrative integration across the American federal system – became completely dependent on, personally identified with, and exclusively responsible to the president. This dependency cannot solely be placed on Wilson's doorstep, of course. Despite direct grants of programmatic authority in statutes, because of both basic constitutional structure and a long train of political and legal precedents, heads of departments depend on the president for most of the real power they enjoy. Yet Wilson's reconception of the locus of interpretive leadership and his reinforcing practice further ensured that administrators at the apex of the American system would define their public responsibilities almost wholly in terms of allegiance to the president's program and not in terms of fidelity to their own interpretations of public opinion and judgments about what might best serve what Norton Long called “power and purpose in the polity” (1949, 264).

Some presidents have been receptive to independent thought and action and even respectful of dissent on the part of their department heads. Yet it is remarkable how much department heads censor their own public rhetoric and restrict the sphere of their actions in order to signal conformity with a conception of their public responsibilities that places devotion to a president and his program on an equal plane with, say, fidelity to the law. It is nearly impossible to detect among these premier administrators any sense of individual or collective responsibility for improving the integration of policy planning and execution and for encouraging good management within the federal government, and certainly not for the American system of government in its entirety. The intent behind the creation of the Bureau of the Budget – but more importantly its move into the Executive Office of the President and its later rechristening as the Office of Management and Budget – was to provide some general focus on policy coordination and management improvement. But the existence of this organization merely reinforces the
point. It is separated from those top officials actually responsible for policy management, and it focuses primarily on fidelity to a president's program through the budget process (see Wamsley 2004, 213-19).

A second consequence of Wilson's failure in conception and practice has been to undermine the central pillar of his reform aims: the development of a secure institutional home for the cultivation of national leadership. Recall that Wilson sought congressional reform precisely because the organization and operation of Congress under the distorting influence of the separation of powers did not lend itself to cultivating national leaders. The establishment of the cabinet as the institutional bridge between policy planning and execution would create incentives for men to come to the fore who possessed talents and energies different than those that dominated Congress at the time, especially with respect to scrutiny of policy design and administrative effectiveness and the nurturing of a public attentive to these concerns. In shifting the institutional correlate for his conception of leadership from Congress to the presidency, thus defining national political leadership almost exclusively in terms of presidential leadership, Wilson contributed substantially to the absence of an institutional proving ground for democratic statesmanship. If, as I have argued, Wilson did indeed envision the president as overseeing both the legislative and administrative processes and binding them together through interpretation of public opinion, then short of the presidency itself, there could be no other public institution where men and women could develop their talents and capacities to fill the role. Wilson further ensured this, in his thought and action, by relegating the cabinet to a purely executive role.

The third and perhaps most worrisome consequence of Wilson's reconception of the locus of political leadership, and his governing practices that conformed to that reconception, is the nearly complete dependency of public administration as a national institution on the president for its general system legitimacy and the specific legitimacy of its formative impact on law and policy. In cementing the disconnection between the tasks of interpretive leadership and administrative integration and in setting the precedent of promoting a program as the prime presidential role for most of his successors, Wilson abandoned the establishment of the systemic or global legitimacy for the purpose-creating aspects of administration that was the prime insight and intellectual innovation of his academic years. Wilson, and some of the presidents who followed him, have sought to instruct public thinking about the legitimacy of administration and the work of public agencies and agency leaders (for a thought-provoking example from the New Deal, see Eden 1989, 55-61). Most, if not all, such efforts have attempted to secure administrative legitimacy by linking it to a presidential program, however.

In the absence of an effort by presidents or top administrator-politicians with an independent sense of political responsibility to legitimate administration by implicating it in the general progressive development of the regime, the trend already underway in Wilson's time became much more deeply rooted. The administrative system has thus remained fragmented, with individual agencies forced to develop independent bases of power and a parochial or, more accurately, a programmatic legitimacy based on reputation and a political support network anchored in both group interests and professional specializations (Carpenter 2001, 14-15, 30-33). Franklin Roosevelt, the Wilson protégé even more politically successful than Wilson himself, further reinforced the particularistic legitimacy of administration by bringing many more groups into political engagement and tying them to administrative agencies, all under the umbrella of presidential programmatic aims (again, see Eden 1989; also Milkis 1993). In placing the leadership and legitimacy burden completely in the president's hands, furthermore, Wilson
helped to release Congress from much of its institutional responsibility for two central governing tasks: first, coordinating policy and administration in a national, collective fashion, and second, giving policy real legal integrity – definite law, in Wilson’s nomenclature – which would keep administration from expanding beyond its capacity and legitimate reach.

Unlike most if not all of the presidents after him, Wilson undertook a recognizable effort to shape in public thought and national opinion an understanding of what he sought to achieve for the nation through his practices regarding administrative expansion and reform. But the vehicle for leadership and legitimacy on which he chose to center his entire scheme did not provide what he sought for his enterprise. It did not empower the modern democratic citizen of the United States by providing either the incentives or the avenues for reconnecting and reengaging with government through scrutiny of national administration and holding officials accountable for the results of their efforts at wielding administrative power. Despite the supposed responsibility-concentrating effects of elections, political accountability in the U.S. remains elusive and obscure, detached from any real consequences. Both presidents and legislators have thus largely abandoned all but superficial pretexts for providing the leadership and legitimacy the administrative state requires. Worse, in their energetic efforts to avoid responsibility and maintain their power, recent generations of political leaders in the U.S. have seriously eroded whatever legitimacy administration had enjoyed, a legitimacy originally generated in part by Wilson’s own efforts. Thus, the central challenge confronting modern public administration and management theory and practice in the U.S. today and in the future is reestablishing the responsible political leadership that provides public administration and public management with its necessary legitimacy so that government can fully harness administrative power to serve “the good of ordinary people.” What institutional foundations might best produce a revamped system of political-administrative leadership relations? I propose that we follow Wilson’s original analytical insights and reform arguments and turn our attention toward cultivating in legislatures the sort of political leadership and its relationship to administration that Wilson envisioned.

REGIME LEADERSHIP IN LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLIES

I take as a valid foundation on which to reconstruct political-administrative relations in advanced democracies a Wilsonian conception of political leadership. In calling this sort of leadership “regime” leadership, I use the term “regime” in its broadest sense. It is not merely the combination of a set of ideological commitments, an interest coalition, and consequent government program that may last as much as a generation and is often associated with a particular political figure – a party leader. My use of the term “regime” means, instead, the combination of aims and aspirations, founding principles, governmental structures, and shared understandings that define a polity – an identifiable political community that endures over time and independent of the waxing and waning of successive programmatic political orders.

Regime leadership in this broad sense is a particularly demanding conception of leadership. A leader of this sort must operate adeptly within an existing political order of established ideological and interest commitments, that is, to engage in transactional leadership, or, in addition, successfully replace an existing political order with a new set of ideological and interest commitments, that is, to transform the political landscape. In both cases, however, a true regime leader must engage in transactional or transformative leadership, or both, while also tending to the maintenance and further development of the basic structures and principles of the polity as a whole. Regime leadership is thus more than transactional or transformative; it is
constitutive. It helps to preserve the basic constitution of the polity while carefully refreshing it by guiding changes in habits, understandings, and principles that make for an even better polity, one that progresses closer to the aspirations set down in founding acts and documents.

But there is still more to the burden of the regime leader. To add the Wilsonian dimension, and thus to address the matter of political-administrative relations, regime leadership recognizes that the democratic state and polity have reached a stage of development in which administration is the central and most substantial, if not exclusive, work of the state. Whether engaged in transactional or transformative acts, the regime leader is centrally responsible for ensuring that the power of administration is harnessed to its fullest extent, which requires preserving or reinforcing its systemic legitimacy. Regime leaders thus are tasked with building or maintaining strong, clear linkages between policy design and policy implementation. They must have the experience and understanding to shape and guide policy design and its execution in order to oversee both to ensure their concordance. Consistent with the tutelary function widely recognized in contemporary literature on democratic leadership, regime leaders must teach the citizenry about administration and cultivate informed citizen scrutiny of program plans and the organization for and effectuation of those plans. While seeking to use administrative power to its fullest extent, regime leaders must ensure that administration is kept within the reasonable bounds of its capacity and role in a liberal-democratic regime, an effort which is essential to securing and sustaining administration’s long-run legitimacy.

National chief executives would seem best suited to fill the regime leadership role and build a new reality for political leader-administrative relations on Wilsonian foundations. Judging from the experience of Wilson and his successors, however, the burdens are simply too great for one individual, no matter how masterful. Limiting reliance for regime leadership to one top executive position also severely limits the broader cultivation of the essential qualities that would ensure a steady supply of regime leaders over successive generations. The question that animated Woodrow Wilson’s original analysis and reform enterprise remains. What institution can best serve to cultivate the kind of responsible, national leadership modern representative democracies need in a thoroughly administrative era?

The obvious alternative is the cabinet. This institution deserves much more scholarly scrutiny as a source of collectively responsible leadership than it has received on either side of the Atlantic. For present purposes, however, several points seem pertinent. First, in the United States, at least, the cabinet has at best severely limited potential for serving as the institutional incubator for regime leadership. Second, even in parliamentary systems in which the cabinet serves as the central mechanism for coordinating policy design and execution, ministers ultimately must be recruited from the national legislature. Third, throughout the twentieth century national legislatures in both the United States and European nations have suffered several crises of identity and have found themselves periodically if not permanently marginalized from governance. Yet representative assemblies are the lifeblood of democratic constitutionalism. Conceptions of liberal-democratic political leadership, including especially relations with administration, are bereft of meaning if not tied in some way to legislatures and law-making. I offer here one brief line of argument for transforming the U.S. Congress into a suitable home for fostering regime leadership.

**Legislative-Centered Public Administration**
In a distinctively valuable contribution to public administration and management theory and practice, David Rosenbloom has recounted the emergence in the United States of what he calls a "legislative-centered public administration" (2000). This major characteristic of contemporary American national governance reflects Congress's concerted effort since the middle of the twentieth century to reclaim its primacy in the constitutional system in the wake of the emergence of the modern administrative state. A legislative-centered public administration also reflects Congress's insistence that administration in both design and operation should be consonant with a legislative understanding of representative government, rather than the orthodox understanding that administration should embody primarily if not exclusively executive values such as efficiency and unity of command.

Especially powerful is Rosenbloom's point that not only is the congressional orientation to the modern administrative state well-rooted and resilient, albeit not immutable, it is also a direct challenge to the rise of new, executive-centered administrative orthodoxies like "reinventing government." Rosenbloom also acknowledges several criticisms to which legislative-centered public administration as currently conceived and practiced might be vulnerable. The first two, that it "promotes usurpation of executive powers" (139) and that it "elevates the wrong values" to which administration ought to adhere, he dispatches with little exertion. The constitutionality of Congress's intrusion has been repeatedly affirmed, and Congress's choices with respect to value emphases are legitimate unless proven "obviously and egregiously wrong" (140). The third criticism is, however, much more significant, and it points out the central problems with legislative-centered public administration that still prevent Congress from becoming the institutional home for the integrating, legitimating national leadership that Wilson envisioned and that public management in the U.S. still needs so that administrative power can assume its proper place and fulfill its role in the regime.

Rosenbloom admits that legislative-centered public administration "contains no self-regulating mechanism. It can promote both excessive and self-serving legislative involvement in public administration" (140-41). Thus the long-recognized problem plaguing Congress as a powerful, autonomous legislative body undisciplined by well-organized programmatic parties – the problem at the heart of Wilson's own reform endeavor – remains. The problems of a legislative-centered public administration are simply that Congress cannot discipline its own behavior with respect to its assertion of primacy over administration, and that in the embrace of the framework it has, in Theodore Lowi's harsh assessment, headed down the path of "legiscide" (1991, 19), that is, the loss of the characteristics of a genuine legislature, namely "deliberation and true collective decision making" (20).

**Leadership Through the Rule of Law**

The way to bring something akin to a self-regulatory mechanism to Congress's legislative-centered approach to structuring and controlling public administration is to impose the discipline of policy with law, that is, to heed Lowi's call to return to a system centered on the rule of law or, in Wilsonian terms, definite law. Adherence to notions of the rule of law or definite law requires specificity in legislative drafting and policy design. The objects of a given policy must be clearly identified, or identifiable, preferably in the form of entities with which policy-makers and citizens have real-world experience. Further, the rules of conduct to which the regulated entities must adhere should as much as possible be spelled out in advance, and the
consequences for failure to adhere to the rules should be delineated. All public policy, in a significant way, would look more like criminal law.

Administrative discretion will still be necessary and essential for good governance because legislators drafting new policy cannot know all they need to know about a problem they seek to address or what responses will work or not work. Thus administrative experimentation and testing of the “suitability” of a law, as Wilson characterized it, is inevitable. Administrative experience can also inform initial policy-making, as can technical expertise in a host of forms. But the rule of law requires that the authority and responsibility for hard decisions about what the problem is and what the rules of behavior required in response should be cannot be turned over wholesale to experts. The boundaries surrounding proper and improper, responsible and irresponsible, conduct will also always be subject to some indeterminateness for which discrete decisions on individual cases must be made. As Wilson argued, however, the discretion that allows for experimentation and testing, and judgment on individual cases, can be guided by expressed priorities and specific decision rules rather than open-ended admonitions to regulate "in the public interest" or to "protect public health with an adequate margin of safety." The opposite extreme of mandating unrealistic formulae or unachievable deadlines that only breed cynicism and manipulative behavior also must be avoided. Greater care in legislative construction also puts administration as an institution in the much more comfortable and legitimate role of supporting the further development and refinement of law rather than having to operate on the very shaky legitimacy grounds of substituting for lawmaking in the legislature.

Two especially significant consequences flow from grounding policy-making more soundly in rule-of-law or definite-law notions. First, American politics and governance will reconnect more firmly to modern liberal ideas of constitutionalism and limited government. Second, Congress will move toward becoming (or becoming again) a "legislature of the first kind" (Lowi 1991).

In the mid-1990s Lowi stated much more starkly than in his original interest-group liberalism thesis that liberal government, properly conceived, is likely to be smaller government. For Lowi this is a much more legitimate basis for smaller government than the "mere ideologically based negation of representative government itself" (1995, 251) that he sees as the preference of post-Reagan conservatives (1995, chs. 4, 5). It is also not a threat but a confirmation of properly liberal-democratic government. "Rule of law definitely puts a cap on democracy. But every constitutional provision does that. The whole point of a constitution is to make some rules for the proper conduct of government and then to permit alteration only by extraordinary, supra-majoritarian means. . . . Thus what we have here is not a question of whether but what kind of caps are placed on democracy. Rule of law is one, the one least observed. Moreover, this cap is reasonable. It is reasonable to deny government the authority to act when it refuses to say in advance how it wants to act" (253, emphasis in original).

Smaller government is hardly anathema to Wilson's precepts or predilections. It is in fact consistent with a host of Wilson's most prominent ideas. In particular, a more limited, smaller government, in which policy and administration are more restrained and well-ordered, less sprawling and vague in intent and effect, is a more manageable object of the more limited capacity for scrutinizing government planning and execution that Wilson recognized in Constitutional Government. Although national public policy and administration will have a somewhat less sweeping impact on the everyday life of citizens under the rule of law, those
consequences that do arise will be sharper and more readily understandable, and they will be based on knowledge citizens will find more accessible and thus better able to appreciate.

As Lowi has pointed out, more sharply defined policy with clear consequences that follow from it will engender opposition in the citizenry, which is in part precisely what leads to smaller government (and, one must admit, to the maneuvering by legislators to hide from the wrath of constituents). But it also means a citizenry more motivated toward scrutiny of and engagement in policy-making and administration. It is certainly not the case, as it was not in Wilson's time, that a continuous grinding out of a politics of relative interest advantage and distribution of policy benefits, much of which still takes place hidden from view, draws anything like sustained citizen engagement in national politics. Hence adherence to the rule of law and the smaller government that might follow is consistent with Wilson's *Congressional Government* aim of reengaging the citizenry in their own governance, rightly understood, and it is consistent with his *Constitutional Government* insight about what will most likely reengage a citizenry leading a modern way of life.

Adherence to the rule of law and the smaller government that might follow also means much less burden on public administration and public management to take on the whole enterprise of governing with little but vague and often conflicting instructions or otherwise marginal engagement on policy substance from elected officials. This easing of the governing burden on administration will also lessen the perpetual suspicions of its legitimacy, whether stemming from doubts about competence, expertise, authority, or constitutionality. Policy more clearly defined with respect to rules of conduct and consequences means policy more effectively carried out. It means administration not pushed beyond its capacity, and a legitimacy rooted in the law—law that spells out rules of conduct and consequences for not meeting them—and not in claims about special knowledge and expertise.

There is of course a serious problem with an approach to policy-making and administration that adheres to the rule of law and thus makes for smaller government. It flies in the face of the one tenet that links both old public administration orthodoxy and new public management orthodoxy, both an executive-centered and a legislative-centered public administration. This tenet is the broad delegation of authority to administrative agencies with little statutory specificity. I earlier argued that Wilson came to see the "large powers and unhampered discretion" he championed as only effective and legitimate when tethered to definite law. Most students of public administration and public policy—indeed, most students of American politics—see the two as incompatible, not complementary. As Rosenbloom argues, Congress chooses to delegate for a variety of reasons: "to alleviate its workload; to avoid a particularly nettlesome political issue; to focus highly specialized administrative expertise on a particular problem; for convenience; or simply because agencies do not face the constraints of a legislature that is reconstituted every two years" (2000, 134). The principal rationale, however, in theory as well as in practice, is that society has gotten so complex that the best Congress can do is identify a problem and direct the bureaucracy to develop the details of a solution and then carry it out. Rosenbloom finds this rationale to be one of the key arguments of supporters of the Administrative Procedure Act (34).

To adopt or return to a rule-of-law or definite-law conception of policy-making would pull Congress back to its foundations resting on "amateur knowledge" rather than "professional knowledge" and the ordinary politics of representative government, and especially to the original founding conception of the organization and character of a representative assembly (Lowi 1991,
A rule-of-law foundation for policy-making in turn positions administration more appropriately to apply its expertise to complex social problem solving via support of the lawmaking process. Congress would still have to be conversant with professional knowledge so that it could scrutinize what administrative agencies do in response to substantive policy directives and so that it could make sense of the policy recommendations emanating from administration. Indeed, professional knowledge, or perhaps more accurately social science knowledge in the form of tests of theories about what works or doesn't work in response to particular societal conditions, might be the basis of the specific rules of conduct that are part of good public policy, that is, policy with law. But Congress would evaluate administration and the policy guidance offered by administration in terms of amateur knowledge and the ordinary politics of representative government. It would, in short, focus much more centrally on policy substance and policy outcomes rather than on the fidelity of the bureaucracy to mandated procedures. It could do so because it would produce policies with real legal substance within the institution that embraces legislative values by its very nature rather than in the institution that must have those values imposed and then monitored for compliance from the outside. Secured to legal substance rather than a legal vacuum, large powers and unhampered discretion can then be, from the point of view of the general citizenry, more trusted and more useful.

Most important for present considerations, a Congress that operates on the basis of a rule-of-law or definite-law conception of policy will see a different kind of leadership emerge. It will be a leadership not "based on analytic, budgetary, or procedural skill" but leadership "based on skill in legislative drafting" (Lowi 1995, 251). This skill in legislative drafting does not mean merely the skill involved in writing a bill. It also means the ability to articulate specific objects of policy and the accompanying explicit rules and sanctions in a way that can garner majority support and in a form that can be refined through experience toward successively better approximations of the problem and the appropriately practical responses. It will take time before citizens rally to such leadership because it will take time for citizens to realize that this leadership is the source of laws they can more readily understand, obey, and respect. But they will reach that realization because such laws do not offer sweeping promises to get to the heart of complex societal problems or eliminate them entirely. Rather, policy with law offers limited, concrete responses to conditions, which can help citizens make increasingly harmonious, practical, and comprehensible adjustments over time.

The implications of the emergence of this kind of legislative leadership for public administration and public management are enormous. As I have already noted, it can link administration to the more limited but still centrally vital and noble purpose of helping society cope with modernity by guiding the refinement and improvement of public law. It can thus replace the predominant image of administration in American political culture as the wholesale substitute for lawmaking, a substitute needing extraordinary arguments in defense of its legitimacy and extraordinary procedural fetters to keep it from endangering democracy. A new kind of national leadership springing from the legislature can tie legislation and administration more closely together without the need for an unconstitutional breach of the separation of powers. Finally, it can lead to citizens embracing administration's legitimacy on the basis of the help it provides them in coping with a tumultuous world. This would be leadership much closer, at least in spirit, to the model of regime leadership I have outlined than the strange combination of unitary commander and national caretaker that passes for national leadership in the U.S., and even in many other advanced democracies, today, a kind of leadership that subjugates and
The problems both types of government faced resided in part in the structure and function of representative assemblies themselves. “Representative government . . . was once looked upon as the panacea for good government and a requisite of the development of democracy” (205-06), a view subsequently replaced by “a general agreement that representative bodies are either inefficient, wasteful or corrupt, and in some instances . . . all three” (206). Hence, in addition to “a well worked out plan of correlation” between the legislature and the executive, Haines insisted that “[n]othing short of a new type of legislative body” would “render modern governments competent to meet the exigencies” of modern life (210).

Rosenbloom’s analysis has shown us how the U.S. Congress responded to this challenge once the world had gotten past its second global war in the span of three decades. But Congress’s response has provided no leadership of the sort that recognizes the simple truth, best seen from the ordinary citizen’s perspective, that making law and carrying it out are part of the same complex; it is all part of governance. Nor does the congressional response acknowledge the formative effect of administrative action – the definition or redefinition of public purposes and subtle alterations in social relations that result from administrative entities carrying out the law. Such effects pose a threat to self-government unless they are properly legitimated. Such legitimation can only come, in representative democracies, from political leadership that accepts and openly acknowledges its ultimate responsibility for the outcomes of its governing decisions, rather than trying to hide that responsibility through far-reaching delegations of authority to public administrators.

Theoretically, at least, cabinet government systems are set up to avoid all these pitfalls. Because they are based on party control of the national legislature, from which then follows party or multi-party coalition control of the government, the continued health of liberal-democratic constitutionalism rooted in the continued vitality of legislative assemblies should be assured. Further, cabinet government systems should exhibit the kind of concentrated political
authority and responsibility, and leadership and legitimation of administration, that ensures not only that government is well run and efficient, but that the exercise of administrative power at least sustains a democratic citizenry if it does not actively foster its further development. Finally, because “the government” – the combination of cabinet and subcabinet posts – is composed of members of the majority party or multi-party coalition in the legislature, cabinet government systems should provide effective leadership recruitment and development that stresses the importance of linking policy design and execution, collective governing, and the central legitimacy of administration under direct, transparent political control.

Of course, the theoretical monolith “cabinet government” does not exist in practice. There are at least three variants among existing national systems: “Westminster-style party government regimes, single-party-dominant systems, and systems in which coalition governments are the norm” (Weaver and Rockman 1993, 450). Party coalition governments appear to operate much more like the American separation-of-powers system with respect to such measures as the extent of concentration of political authority and coordination of policy design and execution (448, 450). Moreover, the relative size, scope, and influence of what Wilson called the “permanent technical service” is also likely to vary considerably across parliamentary systems. There is, furthermore, the matter of how well cabinet ministers can fulfill the dual role of legislator and administrator (Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman 1981, 17), consequently how much formal or informal structures outside the cabinet proper are necessary, and the extent to which they complicate policy coordination and concentration of authority and responsibility (see for example, Rose 1971; Kemp 1986).

There is some further question about the leadership development prowess of cabinet government systems. “The House of Commons is . . . not only a chamber for electing the Prime Minister, but also a school for ministers” Richard Rose observed in his analysis of the making of cabinet ministers in Great Britain (1971, 403). Yet he concluded that the “work of a British MP is certainly no more (and probably) less a preparation for involvement in the executive side of government than is membership in the United States Congress.” Furthermore, there is “no conscious apprenticeship training [for a cabinet position] in a junior ministerial appointment” (404).

Finally, it is important to keep in mind that cabinet government is party government, and parliamentary parties are if anything even more programmatic in orientation than their U.S. counterparts. A regime orientation might more likely be found in the permanent civil service than in the national assembly in cabinet government systems, although the findings from the classic study on such matters (Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman 1981) do not offer a clear indication. A strong case can be made that regime leadership is also more likely among public administrators than among legislators in the United States, with the unfortunate caveat that in the U.S. such leadership among career civil servants will not enjoy the requisite legitimacy because of the absence of concentrated, collective responsibility for what permanent bureaucrats do (Cook 2007a, 239-47).

The relevance to cabinet government systems, of a scheme to promote regime leadership in national legislatures, thus appears difficult to assess. I conclude, then, with several questions I wish to put before the workshop for discussion, for my own further edification, and for guiding future research. Does the concept of regime leadership and the prescription for fostering it within legislatures have any relevance to cabinet government systems? More generally, does it make sense to consider new avenues for shaping the future develop of political-administrative
leadership relations from the perspective of leadership development within parliaments, or, more precisely, among so-called “backbenchers”? Are there nations with cabinet government systems that are experiencing legitimacy troubles with respect to their legislatures, and their administrations, such that exploring ways to develop national leadership within their legislative assemblies, especially with respect to its relations with administration, would be worthwhile? Finally, if the diagnosis and prescription I have offered centered on regime leadership development in the national legislature does not apply to other governmental systems in the Atlantic world, what lessons from these nations might facilitate progress against the troubles with political leadership and administrative legitimacy that continue to plague political-administrative leadership relations in the United States?
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