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Representative Bureaucracy: A Cross-National Analysis of Gender (1996-2004)

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ABSTRACT

To the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper of its kind to analyze the gender representativeness of bureaucrats cross-nationally. It discusses the dearth of comparative representative bureaucracy literature and places this paper within the context of American scholarly literature on representative bureaucracy. After commenting on the disconnect between these literatures and the broad-based international developing literature, it uses panel-corrected time series data in attempt to narrow these scholarly divisions through representative bureaucracy research. My analysis finds that higher levels of income per capita are statistically significant predictors of the percentage of female civil servants at the central government and sub-national levels while greater fiscal decentralization and the percentage of female parliamentarians are also statistically significant predictors at the central government level. It concludes by noting that the commonality discovered across countries of women serving more frequently at the sub-national than central government levels requires further investigation.

“The act of participation in government itself is the vehicle for empowerment” (Wise, 1999, p. 568)

In a 1999 article on India and South Africa, Milton Esman declared that bureaucratic representativeness is an important tool for increasing government legitimacy (Esman, 1999). Despite this observation from one of America’s top comparative public administration scholars, it remains empirically unexplored cross-nationally. By analyzing the representativeness of female bureaucrats at the national and sub-national levels, this paper begins to bridge that gap. It asks whether proxies for the structural, political and economic features of a country have a bearing on the gender representativeness of female civil servants at the national and sub-national levels. Beginning first with an overview of what is understood within the American representative bureaucracy literature before attempting to link this understanding with broader international currents, the paper will then delve into a discussion of the variables of interest, the empirical analysis, findings and suggestions for further research.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Representative Bureaucracy: An American Project?

There is remarkable agreement about whom to credit the discovery of representative bureaucracy. In 1944, J. Donald Kingsley coined the term “representative government” in a study of British civil servants (Kingsley, 1944; Krislov, 1974). Observing gender and class distinctions within the British civil service, he noted that as British society became middle-class, its civil service might also become inhabited by the middle-class. Unlike later research that normatively explores both gender and ethnic representation within the civil service, Kingsley merely argued that “representational participation” should lead to “functional effectiveness” (Kingsley, 1944). Nevertheless, his observations launched a field of inquiry into representative bureaucracy.

In 1948, Dwight Waldo’s discipline-changing argument that there was no dichotomy between politics and administration implied that civil servants are political creatures. As one modern-day author wrote, “If bureaucracy were always neutral in its values, always obeyed elected superiors, and always limited its activities to the enforcement of public laws and rules, then most controversies surrounding bureaucracy would melt away” (Jreisat, 2002, p. 37). This departure from the earlier public administration orthodoxy made it possible for public administration scholars to consider that the sociopolitical appearance of civil servants also mattered. In other words, bureaucracies, their civil services and the civil servants themselves are not apolitical machines. Civil servants perform inherently political tasks and discretion is utilized in the performance of the tasks. The idea behind representative bureaucracy research in America was two-fold. If we encourage representative bureaucracy, the policies that bureaucrats help design and then later implement will better reflect the citizenry they serve. And second, that if we wish to better understand the discretionary outputs of civil servants, we should study the sociopolitical and socioeconomic characteristics of those who filled the civil servant shoes.

On a more theoretical level, if one allows for the fact that representativeness matters within an administrative structure this implies one’s agreement that civil servants *are not apolitical* actors. In contrast, the belief that the Weberian model is either normatively ideal and/or is empirically most efficient suggests that the administrative structures *are uniquely apolitical* facilitators of policy; separate from the politicized legislative or executive leadership positions. Analysis of bureaucratic systems in other countries indicates that among the non-politically appointed civil servants, this assumption of American public administration may not hold cross-nationally (Derlien, 2003; Drewry, 2003) or even whether this dichotomy is uniquely American. While this concept cannot be studied in detail within this paper, we can begin to attack this problem by looking at how gender is distributed within the civil services in other countries.

Nevertheless, by the 1950s and 1960s public administration scholars began to normatively argue that it mattered “which set of bureaucrats” controlled the policy process (Lipset, 1950). Intellectual jumps were being made from the assumed political nature of civil servant work to determining whether these

bureaucrats were themselves representative of their broader public. Bureaucratic representativeness was pertinent since it “provide[d] a means of fostering equity in the policy process by helping to ensure that all interests are represented in the formulation and implementation of policies and programs” (Coleman, Brudney, & Kellough, 1998, p. 719). By the large, over time, scholars came to agree that representative bureaucracy increases government legitimacy, accountability, effectiveness, and participation (Dolan & Rosenbloom, 2003). For the purpose of this paper, it is assumed that representative bureaucracy *a priori* is beneficial.

Passive and Active Representation: Civil Service and Legislative Literatures

Scholarly research has differentiated two types of representative bureaucracy: passive and active. Using gender as an example, passive representation occurs when the number of female civil servants mirrors the ratio of employment-age women within society. Active representation occurs when female civil servants use their position to affect policy options favorable to women (Keiser, Wilkins, Meier, & Holland, 2002; Mosher, 1968; Nachmias & Rosenbloom, 1973). While few would argue that a civil service representative of the gender, religious or ethnic differences of the citizenry is an unworthy objective, disagreements exist about if and when these civil servants become active representatives of their sociopolitical trait(s).

It has been argued that a passive representation of women can affect the public organization, but that it need not lead to active representation (Hindera, 1993; Selden, 1997). Others hypothesized that what mattered was not which societal group the bureaucracy represented but that what was important was the power of the agency itself, as an entity, to influence policy outcomes favorable to the groups represented in society (Romzek & Hendricks, 1982). Moving to active representation, American scholars ask “[w]hen are female bureaucrats merely “standing for” women and when might we expect them to “act for” women” (Keiser, Wilkins, Meier, & Holland, 2002, p. 553). Keiser, et al (2002) argued that not only bureaucratic structures that influence civil servants, but that the civil servants themselves symbiotically influence the structure. The researchers found an empirical link between passive and active representation, in particular in relatively flat institutional hierarchies. Furthermore, men and women react differently to their roles as administrators and that specifically, women “devote *more* time on both developing policy and garnering public support” (Bowling, Kelleher, & Wright, 2005, p. 16). In a study on the impact of minority teachers on the standardized test performance of Texas students, it was determined that increases in minority teachers lead to increased performance for both minority and Anglo students. The study concludes “[r]epresentative bureaucracies are more effective at meeting their goals than non-representative bureaucracies in similar circumstances” (Meier, Wrinkle, & Polinard, 1999, p. 1037).ⁱ

Within the American legislative branch literature, scholars have found that women seek office and are elected to office more frequently at the sub-national level than the national level. Once in office, female legislators often view policy issues differently from men and are more likely “act for” women by creating policies beneficial to this constituency (Thomas, 1994). A study of female appointees to public office in the late 1970s and early 1980s confirmed these observations for the highest levels of public service. The author found that appointed women more often held feminist views and “were inspired and assisted by other women” (Rajoppi, 1983, p. 93).

Representative Bureaucracy Cross-Nationally: Why it Never Became a Priority

Where does representative bureaucracy fit into broader comparative trends of comparative research? The disappointing answer is that it is not a priority for either comparative public administration scholars or among those international financial institutions and aid agencies that influence civil service development of dozens of developing nations. This paper posits that the reason for the first omission has been a historical lack of data and the reason for the second is related to first along with an acknowledgement that the neoliberal agenda and its efficiency-first method espoused by these international institutions overlooks the politics that drive bureaucratic decision-making and implementation.ⁱⁱ

The fact that comparative public administration has long suffered from deficient data is not new. The case study movement that spearheaded the 1950s era in American public administration would be transferred to comparative public administration in the 1960s and 1970s by such comparative leaders as Fred Riggs and Milton Esman (Esman, 1970; Jreisat, 2002; Riggs, 1970). These case studies, following the methodological trends of the broader social science community, were predominately qualitative with descriptive statistics included as available and on an as-needed basis. The trend for one-country case studies or one-country studies of aspects of administrative system has continued today. Broad-based data gathering objectives on public administration systems, functions, or processes have been, and continue to not be, scholarly priorities.

Instead, comparative public administration scholars sought to use their case studies to create administrative typologies that modeled bureaucracy and/or its functions and processes (Braibanti, 1970; Diamant, 1970; Eisenstadt, 1967; Heady, 1970; Jreisat, 2002; Katz, 1970; LaPalombara, 1970; Waldo, 1967). Others trained developing country public administrators on how to Westernize their local bureaucracy and civil service (Braibanti, 1970; Esman, 1970; Viswanathan, 1995).ⁱⁱⁱ American scholars busied themselves listing normative reasons behind the “failures” of public administration in the developing world, and as importantly, repeatedly trying and failing to implement a Weberian ideal-type bureaucratic system within the developmental context (Esman, 1970; Haque, 1997). Conspicuously absent was an emphasis on representative bureaucracy. Further hampering discussion of representative bureaucracy is the fact that the bureaucratic unit, as a whole, has been and continues to be favored unit of analysis (Tummala, 2003). As a result, comparative investigations of even civil service systems and much less, their representative aspects, remain at best “unavailable or tentative” (Jreisat, 2002, p. 19).

At the same time, scholars in the field of comparative politics were making scholarly contributions that would change the field of focus for internationally oriented public administration scholars. In 1960, Walter Rostow argued that all countries could be placed along one of five stages of economic development: the traditional society, the pre-conditions for take-off, the drive to economic security, and in the stage where most Western nations fell, the age of mass consumption (Rostow, 1960). The common policy denominator was that modernization could be achieved through economic reform. Certain comparative public administration scholars and political scientists who concerned themselves with study of bureaucracy found room for modernization theory in their studies (Braibanti, 1970; Esman, 1970) but more generally, the comparative politics scholars were organizing around another trend whereby the primacy given to politics and administration for “solving” problems of development would soon become eclipsed.

Rostow’s work would lead to the primacy of a new group of social scientists: the economists. And here is where the separation between comparative public administration and international development would see its first fissures. At the 1968 Minnowbrook Conference at Syracuse University, public administration scholars found themselves frustrated observers of the political and social changes occurring in America. Viewing the field of public administration as still unable to build a theory of public administration, and worse, after years of case studies, unable to predict or solve the then present-day social movements, the scholars sought to create a “new” public administration. This “new” focus asked public administrators to involve themselves in an inherently political task: improving “social equity.” For these scholars, their tools included decentralization and representative bureaucracy. Decentralization “was viewed as one means of clarifying and strengthening the link between the bureaucracy and the citizenry” (Ingraham & Rosenbloom, 1989, p. 121). While this focus on decentralization as a method for improving policy-citizen linkage would resurface years later among World Bank economists, the field of American public administration would turn inward and begin, in earnest, a research agenda that considered representative bureaucracy in greater detail.

More recently, the evolving re-interest of comparative politics scholars in the “state” and of international donor agencies in “governance” has led us to the early stage of broader-based dataset development. Many of these datasets only began their active life in the early to mid-1990s and as such, their usefulness beyond small-year studies is not yet upon us. Even though this study will draw from the

more established Government Finance Statistics compiled by International Monetary Fund (IMF), this study would not be possible without use of the newly compiled governance database of the World Bank. More detail will follow in the Methodology and Data section.

Representative Bureaucracy: Still Not an International Priority

The resulting fascination within the development community over economic theory led to fiscal reform, trade liberalization, and privatization policies (implemented via “structural adjustment” packages) to dominate international development from the early 1980s to the mid-1990s. With many developing countries facing high debt/GNP ratios and low or inconsistent annual growth, structural adjustment was viewed as the cure and necessary condition for further international assistance. By 1989, the development community had put together a list of ten “lessons learned” from these development practices. If this so-called “Washington Consensus” incentivized the fiscal and market structures of an economy, the newly emerging “second-generation” reforms of the mid-1990s would focus on just the opposite, incentivizing and reforming institutions.

This rediscovery of governance was brought about by new analyses indicating that structural adjustment reforms, while reducing inflation and overall economic uncertainty, occurred at a cost: an increase in poverty and inequality (WorldBank, 1997). The primary tool for rediscovering governance and the importance of the state and its institutions was decentralization. According to one author, this conception of the state and its institutions exists because international financial institutions like the World Bank see “... no solid line connecting citizens and government appointees, only elected officials, not bureaucrats, represent citizens. The adherents of this interpretation seek the protection of democratic values from an assumed influx of “bureaucratic despotism” (Jreisat, 2002, p. 92). Among World Bank policymakers, decentralization is policy tool considered capable of promoting newly-important “pro-poor” development policies such as increasing political legitimacy, empowering disadvantaged groups (by ethnicity or by gender), and strengthening local community participation (WorldBank, 2002a). Its familiarity to scholars supportive of the social equity movement within public administration should recognize familiar ideas, even if they disagree with the Bank of the proper solution.

Unlike “representative bureaucracy,” there is little agreement as to how to define decentralization. Since the decentralization data for this study are from the IMF and the World Bank, their definitions are utilized. Most broadly stated, “[d]ecentralization is a multi-dimensional process that involves the transfer of political, fiscal and administrative responsibilities and powers from the central government to intermediate and local governments” (Litvack, Ahmad, & Bird, 1998; WorldBank, n.d.-b). There are three generally agreed-upon types of decentralization: political, fiscal, and administrative. Fiscal decentralization is defined by the World Bank as the transferring of “expenditure responsibilities and revenue assignments to lower levels of government” (WorldBank, n.d.-c). In practice, the World Bank only publishes cross-national data on the share of sub-national expenditures and tax revenues as a percentage of national expenditures and tax revenues without referencing the authority or ability of the sub-national governments to collect, spend, or manage these monies (WorldBank, 2000). The authority to do that task at the sub-national level requires administrative decentralization while merely having a jurisdictional area below the nation-state requires political decentralization. Due to data limitations, this study focuses only the linkage between fiscal decentralization and civil servant gender representativeness.^{iv}

Reforming the governing institutions of developing countries has been a long-term focus of the World Bank. The decentralization of those institutions along neo-liberal lines is a newer occurrence. Given World Bank leadership in international development policy and practice, its projects are an indicator of development priorities. The World Bank approved its first project with a decentralization component in 1975 and 12 more projects would be approved in the 1970s and 1980s. Between 1990 and 1997, 151 projects with a decentralization component were deployed. With the World Bank’s publication of *Beyond the Washington Consensus: Institutions Matter* (WorldBank, 1997), approval for projects with a decentralization component doubled. Since 1998, over 300 more have been approved at a rate of 37 projects per year and total cost of \$23 billion. Even though the World Bank relates decentralization and

public administration within the projects, civil service representativeness is infrequently discussed. Instead, civil servant (re) training, (re) appropriation of their functions, creating effective processes, and improving bureaucratic outcomes are goals. These topics are also key components of U.S.-based public administration research. Yet, a primary difference between U.S. research and the work of the international development community is the inattention of the latter to representative bureaucracy.

In conclusion of this section, we must come to this “rediscovery” of the persistent, long-term, multi-dimensional nature of poverty. In response to this observation, over 190 countries agreed to eight development goals, which they insist will reduce world poverty in half by 2015. The third of these so-called Millennium Development Goals is the empowerment of women and the promotion of gender equity. The quantitative measures for determining progress include measures of literacy, the percentages of women serving in parliament, and shares of wage employment (United Nations, 2005). Arguing that these measures of empowerment are important, but not sufficient, this study goes beyond calls for increased gender equity in the legislature to explore gender equity within the civil service.

Measuring Passive Representation Cross-Nationally

Even though the debates on active representation are more “current” within the U.S.-based public administration literature, this paper cannot make the assumption that active representation of civil servants is of sociopolitical importance cross-nationally in part because available data do not allow individual-level or agency-level analysis. In other words, data limitations shunt our ability to study representative bureaucracy cross-nationally in any form other than passive representation. This is a similar starting point to where representative bureaucracy began its own research in the 1970s, that is, only focused on passive and not active, representation (Dolan & Rosenbloom, 2003).

In the 1970s, this literature frequently looked at the political and economic backgrounds of civil servants. Able to use individual or agency-level data, variables explored included: age of civil servant (Bullard & Wright, 1993; Meier & Nigro, 1976), ethnicity of civil servant (Barnett, Baron, & Smart, 2000; Eisinger, 1982; Meier & Stewart Jr, 1992; Rosenbloom & Featherstonhaugh, 1977), previous civil service employment (Barnett, Baron, & Smart, 2000), father’s occupation (Meier, 1975; Meier & Nigro, 1976), political views or political activity of civil servant (Bullard & Wright, 1993; Meier, 1975; Rosenbloom & Featherstonhaugh, 1977), salary level (Barnett, Baron, & Smart, 2000; Lewis, 1996; Meier, 1975; Meier & Stewart Jr, 1992; Wise, 1999), educational specialization, (Bullard & Wright, 1993), region (Meier & Nigro, 1976), hours worked by civil servant (Bullard & Wright, 1993), regulatory and redistributive functions of agencies (Miller, Kerr, & Reid, 1999) or work habits, gender of mentor, organizational factors (Naff, 2001). It is important to note that none of these variables are currently available cross-nationally. Several of the above variables attempt to understand the work environment and past experiences of the civil servants. Others, more relevant to this study, are exploring sociopolitical and socioeconomic perspectives.

In 1976, Meier and Nigro explored the regional origin of civil servants to see if there was a urban-rural bias (Meier & Nigro, 1976). In contrast, this paper explores geographical space quite differently. If, in the legislative literature, women are more likely to seek political office at the sub-national (i.e. state, province, city, town) levels, we should if they also more likely to serve as civil servants at the sub-national level as well? Looking at data from the International Labour Organization (ILO) shows that indeed, more American women served as civil servants at the sub-national levels (58.7 percent) than at the national level (42.7 percent) between 1996 and 2004 (See Table 1). If it is true that women do serve more frequently at the local levels, what might be the reasons? One option is structural. That is, due the federalized nature of the American system, there are opportunities available for women to serve at the local level. These opportunities may not be available in countries either where the central government drives policy and action and/or there is no decentralization of policy-making, implementation or even tax and spend authorities. This lack of U.S.-based research on this topic is primarily due to the relatively unchanging federal nature of federal, state and local structures as well as the fact that comparative research has not, until recently within the international development arena, considered a

decentralized structure as a prerequisite to greater accountability, representativeness and government effectiveness.

With the unit of analysis for this study remaining at country and sub-national levels,^v available proxies for measuring political and economic opportunities include both measures of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (US\$)(2000), a voice and accountability index, and the percentage of female parliamentarians. The proxy variable for understanding structural differences will be a measure of fiscal decentralization. Each of these variables will be discussed in greater detail in the next section on Methodology and Data.

METHODOLOGY AND DATA

Method

Two sets of panel-corrected time series model are analyzed. The units of analysis are countries and the time period under consideration is 1996-2004. This time period was selected not only for where and when the data is most complete, but as importantly so as to include the voice and accountability index which only began data collection in 1996. The differences between the two models are its dependent variables. The dependent variable for the central government model is the percentage of female civil servants within central governments while the dependent variable for the sub-national models is the percentage of female civil servants within sub-national governments.

Each set of models includes three versions of the model (sub-models). All six sub-models include a transformed income variable of gross national product per capita. Following trends elsewhere, this variable was transformed into a log. Each model also includes a proxy for political rights: a voice and accountability index. This index required no transformation. All models also include a version of the key structural variable, the percentage of fiscal decentralization. Due to missing data, two of the three models required that the mean level of fiscal decentralization (averaged among available years) be included instead of each value per year. The third sub-model within each level of government adds a fourth variable: percentage of female parliamentarians, which was also transformed by a log. To summarize:

Central Government Models

Model C1: % of Women_Central = $\beta_0 - \beta X_{\text{Fiscal_Decentralization}} + \beta X_{\text{Voice_ \& _Accountability}} + (\log) \beta X_{\text{GDP_per_capita}}$

Model C2: % of Women_Central = $\beta_0 - \beta X_{\text{Fiscal_MEAN}} + \beta X_{\text{Voice_ \& _Accountability}} + (\log) \beta X_{\text{GDP_per_capita}}$

Model C3: % of Women_Central = $\beta_0 - \beta X_{\text{Fiscal_MEANn}} + \beta X_{\text{Voice_ \& _Accountability}} + (\log) \beta X_{\text{GDP_per_capita}} + (\log) \beta X_{\text{Female_Parliamentarians}}$

| Sub-National | Government | Models |
|--------------|------------|--------|
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| | | |
|---|--|--|
| Model SN1: % of Women_Central = $\beta_0 + \beta X_{\text{Fiscal_Decentralization}} + \beta X_{\text{Voice_ \& _Accountability}} + (\log) \beta X_{\text{GDP_per_capita}}$ | | |
| Model SN2: % of Women_Central = $\beta_0 + \beta X_{\text{Fiscal_MEAN}} + \beta X_{\text{Voice_ \& _Accountability}} + (\log) \beta X_{\text{GDP_per_capita}}$ | | |
| Model SN3: % of Women_Central = $\beta_0 + \beta X_{\text{Fiscal_MEANn}} + \beta X_{\text{Voice_ \& _Accountability}} + (\log) \beta X_{\text{GDP_per_capita}} + (\log) \beta X_{\text{Female_Parliamentarians}}$ | | |

Where:

- Women_Central: Number of female civil servants as a proportion of total civil servants at the central government level.
- Women_Sub-National: Number of female civil servants as a proportion of total civil servants at the regional and local government level.
- Fiscal_Decentralization: Sub-national expenditures (as % of national expenditures).
- Fiscal_MEAN: The mean rate per country of sub-national expenditures as a percentage of national expenditures.
- Voice_&_Accountability: Measure of voice and accountability (civil, human, and political rights).

- GDP_per_capita: Gross domestic product per capita (US\$ in year 2000 dollars)
- Female_Parliamentarians: Number of female parliamentarians as a proportion of total parliamentarians.

Dependent Variable Data

Gender Equity within the Civil Service (Central and Sub-National Levels)

There is no singly accepted measure of representative bureaucracy. The first widely discussed measure was the “Nachmias-Rosenbloom Measure of Integration” (Nachmias & Rosenbloom, 1973). This index postulates a mathematical formulation whereby integration is the total number of social characteristics (say, gender or ethnicity) and the frequency of those characteristics within the group you are measuring. This measure has been praised as having significant measurement validity (Guajardo, 1996), but, in measures with just two variables (such male/female) it leads to questions over its linearity. Another common measure is to determine the percentage of target group in a bureaucracy (say Hispanic women) and divide that by the percentage of Hispanic women in the surrounding community. However, as Meier and Stewart (1991) point out, this measure can be sensitive to extreme values (Meier & Stewart Jr, 1992). Others measure female representation by dividing the percentage of working-age women in the population by the percentage of female civil servants (Sigelman, 1976). This latter option appears most reasonable, however, given the paucity of data cross-nationally on the numbers of working age women, this paper instead divides the number of women in the civil service by the total number of civil servants. The resulting variable is the percentage of female civil servants at the central government or sub-national government levels. This measure has the advantage of being more robust cross-nationally as it diminishes any differences in the number of civil service positions as a percentage of employable positions within society. A country where one-third of all employment is in the state sector will be equalized to a country with five percent of available employment occurring within the civil service.

There are two dependent variables in this study: percent of female civil servants at the national and percent of female civil servants at the sub-national level.^{vi} The employment data is available from the International Labor Organization’s LABORSTA database (ILO, 2004). Even though data is available from 1985 to 2004, for this paper the range utilized is 1996 to 2004.^{vii} The data is an interval variable with a scale of 0 to 100 percent. The closer a percentage is to 50 percent, the more gender-equitable is the sub-national or central government under discussion. Three notes of caution are required for the dependent variable data. First, not every country surveyed has both regional and local political jurisdictions. If a country has both regional and local jurisdictions, the employment data was added together for each gender before creating the dependent variable. Second, none of the countries included had dependent variable data for all years. Third, groupings of 30, 40 and 37 countries were included in the central government sub-models C1, C2 and C3 while for the sub-national models, groups of 17, 24 and 22 were included, respectively (see Tables 6-11).^{viii} The average number of observations (out of six possible) per central government model is 1.7, 4.1 and 3.5 and 1.6, 3.6, and 3.1 for the sub-nationals models.^{ix}

Independent Variable Data

Fiscal Decentralization

There are several potential measures of fiscal decentralization. Operationally, fiscal decentralization involves differing expenditures and revenue-collecting responsibilities between levels of government, intergovernmental grant systems, and monitoring of flows between government levels (Ahmad, Devarajan, Khemani, & Shah, 2005). Not all governments apply the same operational mechanisms and some countries may have regulatory rules on the books, but their practices may differ. Other scholars measure fiscal decentralization as fiscal transfers (Ndegwe, 2002). For this paper, the fiscal decentralization data is from the IMF’s 2001 *Government Finance Statistics* (IMF, 2001). It is reported as an interval variable ranging from 0 to 100 percent where 100 percent means complete fiscal decentralization. Fiscal decentralization is measured as sub-national expenditures (as % of total expenditures) in order to equalize legal and regulatory differences across countries (Fisman & Gatti, 2000). The practice in other scholarly papers has been to report expenditures as an average over the years

in which data is available. This practice is continued in two of the sub-models (C2, C3 and SN2, SN3) for each of the central government and sub-national models. As a point of comparison only, the non-averaged scores are included in models C1 and SN1. As it turns out, the mean level of fiscal decentralization per country versus the inclusion of each fiscal decentralization indicators per country is highly correlated at 0.9905. This high correlation underscores a reason behind earlier authors only reporting this value as a mean. However, given that one research question of this paper is whether greater fiscal decentralization impacts gender representation and thus, we may find differences across years, my models reflect both calculations.

It is expected that higher levels of fiscal decentralization (or fiscal mean) will be positively related to the number of women employed at the sub-national level. It may be that the more money sub-national governments have to spend, the greater the opportunity for increased civil service employment opportunities and by extension, more opportunities for female employment. In contrast, we expect to find a negative relationship between fiscal decentralization (or fiscal mean) and the percentage of female civil servants at the central government level. This relationship is expected for different reasons than the sub-national model. While national governments generally have more money to spend than sub-national governments, national governments are located in capital cities where women have other employment opportunities. In addition, at the sub-national levels, women who wish to serve as public servants can do so more easily without moving themselves and their families to the central seat of government. To summarize:

H1: There will be a *negative* relationship between percentage of female civil servants at the central government level and higher levels of fiscal decentralization.

H2: There will be a *positive* relationship between percentage of female civil servants at the sub-national government level and higher levels of fiscal decentralization.

Voice and Accountability

The Voice and Accountability Index is from the World Bank's Aggregate Governance Indicators database (1996-2004). The governance indicators were compiled from nearly three-dozen sources including survey institutes, think tanks, non-governmental organizations, and international organizations and measures political, civil and human rights. The index was created biennially from 1996 until 2002 and then annually thereafter. It is a continuous variable with each country given a value between -2.5 to 2.5. The highest value (2.5) is for countries with greatest amount of voice and accountability while the lowest value (-2.5) is for those with the least. This range of scores is equivalent to z-scores where a score of 2.5 indicates that a country is 2.5 standard deviations away from the mean (Kaufmann, 2005). The greater the freedom available for women to express their opinion, the more likely they are to not only be eligible for outside employment, but, if they chose a civil service career, believe they can express their opinion within the civil service environment. It is expected that countries with greater voice and accountability will positively related to the percentage of female civil servants at the central and sub-national levels. To summarize:

H3: There will be a *positive* relationship between percentage of female civil servants at the central government level and higher voice and accountability scores.

H4: There will be a *positive* relationship between percentage of female civil servants at the sub-national government level and higher voice and accountability scores.

GDP per capita (US\$)(2000)

The gross domestic product (GDP), measured on a per capita basis is our income variable. This data is from the World Bank's World Development Indicators. All data is in 2000 US\$ and is logged, as is the custom with cross-national income variables. Rises in income have long been considered important drivers for international development and gender equity. Lower-income countries tend to have greater

gender inequality while within countries, those are the poorest are also often suffering from gender barriers (WorldBank, 2002b). Thus, it is expected that higher incomes will lead to societies where not only women will enter the formal economy, but where it is reasonable to expect that women may also feel free choose civil servant employment opportunities. To summarize:

H5: There will be a *positive* relationship between percentage of female civil servants at the central government level and higher incomes.

H6: There will be a *positive* relationship between percentage of female civil servants at the sub-national government level and higher incomes.

Female Parliamentarians

The percentage of female parliamentarians is the final variable. The data for this variable is from the World Bank's World Development Indicators. It is an interval variable reported as the percentage of parliamentarians. As far as this author is aware, there is almost no theoretical or empirical research linking the number of female parliamentarians to the number of female civil servants despite numerous articles discussing each literature separately. While certain countries advocate that a minimum percentage of seats are reserved for women, it is not expected to impact whether a woman decides to run for office or to serve in office as a public servant. This is assumed despite the fact that others have observed limited talent pools for female parliamentarians (Mezey, 1994; Miller, Kerr, & Reid, 1999). It is expected that female parliamentarians are influenced by similar political and economic conditions as female civil servants and therefore, we expect a positive relationship between the number of female parliamentarians and the number of female civil servants at the central sub-national level. To summarize:

H7: There will be a *positive* relationship between percentage of female civil servants at the central government level and countries with higher percentages of female parliamentarians.

H8: There will be a *positive* relationship between percentage of female civil servants at the sub-national government level and countries with higher percentages of female parliamentarians.

FINDINGS

Starting first with the central government models, Table 12 indicates that fiscal decentralization was a statistically significant predictor ($p < .01$) of the percentage of female civil servants within central governments. The observations within the U.S.-based representative bureaucracy literature that women are more likely to serve at the sub-national levels as opposed to the central government level are also likely to occur cross-nationally. Among the countries included in each of the central government models, the United States consistently has one of the highest levels of fiscal decentralization. Its ratio of central (58.7 percent) to sub-national female (42.7 percent) employment is also reflective of trends elsewhere (See Tables 1, 6-11).^x In other words, while we cannot say that decentralized structures are entirely responsible for predicting female employment at the central government level, we can be more than 99 percent confident that it is a statistically significant predictor. We cannot be so certain of its importance at the sub-national levels since it was not statistically significant (See Table 13). Income was also a statistically significant predictor of female employment at the central government level. In fact, it was the only statistically significant predictor of any variable within the sub-national models (See Tables 12, 13). While its statistical significance varied from greater than 90 percent to greater than 99 percent confidence, its positive relationship across all six models indicates that as income per capita increases, women are more likely to find themselves employed at both central and sub-national governments.

Looking at our descriptive statistics, a potential reason for this result is immediately clear. When we look at Tables 14 and 15, we find that the countries represented in each model are skewed toward higher-income countries. While 46.1 percent of all member countries of the World Bank are either upper-middle or high income countries, in these particular models, these two income categories range from 75.0 (Model C2) to 86.4 percent (Model SN3) of all countries included in the models. Table 14 also indicates

that only one of the potentially 54 low-income countries was included in any of these models. While this country (India) is clearly a disproportionately large country in terms of its population, another 53 countries never had enough data to be included. Most often these low-income countries had valid data points for either income and/or voice/accountability but would not have either sufficient fiscal decentralization or gendered employment data. This is due, in part to the difficulty of collecting such data, which is discussed more in detail in the concluding section.

Of greater interest however, is that fact that despite these data collection problems our descriptive statistics indicate a broader trend outside of the regression models. The limitation (and benefit) of regression models is that for a country to be included, it must have data points for each of the variables for that year. This naturally benefits those countries that are most able to collect such data. However, what is not included in these regression models are data points from the many countries that could not have been included, but if had, may have lead to similar results. According to Table 3, data was available for 87 countries and total of 476 observations at the central government level. With a mean percentage of female civil servants at 41.2 percent, this indicates that 87 of the 208 member countries of the World Bank (~40 percent) employ more men than women at the central government level. While more than half of these countries were dropped when placed into a regression, our regression results indicate a similar story. With a mean rate of 41.2 percent for women at the central government level, our three models included countries with similar rates. Even though these rates were slightly biased upward in each model (43.8, 44.8, and 45.5 percent for Models C1-C3, respectively), they still match the perception that women are less represented than men at the central government levels.

This trend is not unique to either rich or poor countries. In most countries, women were less represented than men at the central government levels. Among all countries where data was available, the only countries where women out-numbered men for one or more years were Argentina (1996, 1998-2000), Bahamas (1995-1999), Barbados (1997, 1999-2000), Belgium (1998-1999), Botswana (2000-2002), Bulgaria (1996-2003), Colombia (1998, 2000-2003), Costa Rica (1998), Estonia (1995-2004), Greenland (1996), Isle of Man (1996, 2001), Latvia (1997-2004), Lithuania (1996-2003), Malaysia (1999), New Zealand (1995, 1997-2004), Norway (2002), Panama (1999), Philippines (1997-1999, 2001-2004), Poland (1995-2003), San Marino (1995, 1998-2004), Slovenia (1995-1998), and Spain (1998).^{xi} In many of these countries the ratio between men and women is very near to parity with Slovenia, Lithuania, Estonia and New Zealand averaging over 60 percent. Looking more closely, there seems to be little binding these countries together. Even though nearly half are from Europe (Western and Eastern) or are a developed countries, one is predominately Muslim (Malaysia) and some are quite large geographically (Philippines, Argentina) while several are not. The types of governmental styles vary as much as their incomes. The explanation for this diversity of countries may be as fascinating for explaining why countries we might have suspected should be included, were not. Finding this answer is beyond the scope of this paper and requires further country-by-country research and comparison.

Like the United States, the trend in countries was for more women to be represented at the sub-national levels. Of the potential 32 countries (and 178 observations) of data, our models included 17, 22, and 24 of those countries, respectively. This ratio of inclusion is higher than the central government model presumably reflecting the fact that if a country can collect sub-national gender data they are also quite likely to consistently collect all the data required. The mean value of women represented at the sub-national levels was 54.8, 53.5 and 55.6 percent for each of the sub-national models in comparison to the 50.4 predicted from all of the available data, including those countries that did not make it into the final models. The sub-national models are biased toward countries with higher number of female civil servants at the sub-national level. Countries where men outnumbered women at the sub-national level included Albania (1995-2002), Australia (1995), Botswana (1995-1999), China (1995-1997), Costa Rica (1995-1998), Ethiopia (1997-2000), Fiji (1996), Georgia (1998-1999), India (1995-2003), Japan (1996, 2001), Luxembourg (1997-2000), Malaysia (1995-2000), Mauritius (1995-2004), Netherlands (1995, 1997, 2000-2003), New Zealand (1995, 1997-2004), Reunion (1995-1999), Russia (2000), Spain (1995-1999), and Zimbabwe (1995-1999). Like the central government models, the diversity among these countries is

equally astounding. Interestingly, several countries appeared on the central and sub-national lists and these are countries that show opposite patterns to the United States and to the rest of sample. The countries of Botswana, Malaysia, Spain, Costa Rica and New Zealand in one or more years had a majority of civil servants being female at the national level than the sub-national levels. Furthermore, in several countries including India, Mauritius and Zimbabwe, women held less than 30 percent of positions at both the sub-national and national levels. While in the case of India and Zimbabwe, one might easily argue this is due to cultural factors, in Mauritius, an upper-middle income country with a democratic tradition that currently must import labor to fulfill the requirements of its booming economy, the reasons are less clear. At first glance, there are no obvious similarities among these countries and thus, further research is clearly required to help dissect and to understand not only these difference, but why such broad differentiation have occurred cross-nationally.

Given that many of the countries included in these models were upper-middle or high income countries with a democratic tradition or even, in certain countries as just profiled, with women at or above gender parity, voice and accountability was surprisingly not a statistically significant predictor of either central or sub-national government employment of women. One potential reason for this outcome is again related to missing data, not for the indicator itself, but when combined with the others in the model. According to Table 3, this indicator had the broadest reach of countries. Of the 208 countries that are World Bank members, 204 had at least one year of data for voice and accountability. With a mean averaging near zero for these 1,361 observations, the skewing toward countries with high index level is quite large. Among central government models, the mean ranged from .683 to .740 while for the sub-national model it was between .984 and 1.078. Given this is measure of political, civil, and human rights; it is worrisome that these rights, which we take for granted in the West are not significantly impacting employment decision-making. With neoliberal models espoused by the international financial community in the 1980s revolving around trends toward fiscal decentralization and income improvements as more important than the political environment, this rather disappointing finding may only lend further weight to economic models of development. However, at this stage, given the drastic reduction in countries actually covered by these models as compared to the amount of data available (204 countries potential and between 17 and 40 countries actually entered into the models), it is inappropriate to make any narrow (or even broad) statement regarding the meaning of this tentative results. Without future research into whether these countries have legitimate and enforceable equal opportunity laws, these findings must remain highly preliminary.

The statistical significance of higher levels of income as a predictor of female employment within the central and sub-national governments was not surprising. Like the other variables, the countries included in my models were biased toward those countries with higher levels of income. With potential of 182 countries and nearly 2,500 observations this variable had the greatest breadth of information. With incomes per capita ranging from \$57 (Liberia) to nearly \$50,000 (Luxembourg) there was a wide range of income differentials. The mean value of all possible data points was \$5,710, an amount that is nearly doubled for the countries included in the central government model and then more than tripled for those included in the sub-national models. Without further gendered data from the poorer countries we cannot yet make an assumption that the poorest countries are least likely to have female employees at either level of government. With lower-middle income countries like the Philippines averaging more than 50 percent female employment at the central government level, it is far from clear if any pattern among the poorest countries can be discerned at this stage.

Finally, the percentage of female parliamentarians was included in one sub-model for each of the central and sub-national levels. Its statistical significance at the central government level, but not at the sub-national level is puzzling. The sub-national level had statistical significance of .106 just missing the 90 percent confidence level. However, in neither the broadly available data (178 countries and over 1,400 observations) nor the models did the mean percentage of female parliamentarians ever exceed 23 percent. With the wide difference between female representation at the central government or even sub-national levels in comparison to the parliament, there are at least two implications. The first is that its statistical

significance in the central government model implies that gendered employment within countries is tied across employment sectors. More importantly, however, it may imply that it is more difficult for women to serve in a parliamentary capacity than in a civil servant capacity. Reasons for this are unknown in part because these two subjects are rarely studied in unison. It can be surmised, however, that the elected nature of the parliamentary position, the need to gather broad-based support across genders and the high hourly commitment for such tasks may disfavor women across countries.

NEXT STEPS: MORE QUESTIONS THAN ANSWERS

It is clear from the above findings that there remain more questions than answers. This appears to be a reasonable conclusion given that this is the first time any cross-national study on representative bureaucracy has been undertaken. From a practical standpoint, there further data collection is required. Data collection was hampered not by insufficient data on my political or economic indicators, but on the fiscal decentralization and the percentage of female civil servants. Both of these data points require more intensive data collection with more emphasis on record maintenance than the other two variables. With voice and accountability indexed based on what not just in-country, by external to the country assessment, its reliance on local data collection is less pronounced than the other variables. Even income per capita is relatively simple to collect. Today, countries have excellent notions of what their earned income was, is and will be. Financial transactions, loans, exports, imports, all rely on the same accounting techniques. In contrast, fiscal decentralization requires more complex data collection. Its primary units of data collection occur at the sub-national levels where accounting knowledge and expertise can vary widely or even, in some cases, be little emphasized if there are few if any expenditure or revenue responsibilities. Similar logics exist for collecting gender data. Interestingly, this paper was originally planned to be a discussion of ethnicity within civil services around the world. However, to-date, I have yet to find one reliable measure of ethnic representation and thus, turned my attention to women where data is relatively, at least, more plentiful. Moreover, the value that Western cultures place on workplace diversity is written in laws and regulations. If countries do not hold similar values, the notion of even collecting this type of information would not even be considered.

Beyond these practical difficulties is a much broader and more international problem. When we look at the Millennium Development Goals, one of the eight goals is to improve gender equity by 2015. Rightfully, one of the indicators for measuring progress toward this goal is increasing the number of female parliamentarians. The assumption that women, once in parliament, are more likely to act for women is ingrained within this measurement. However, there is no such priority for female representation within the civil services. Whether this is because the neoliberally minded policymakers stop their understanding of the bureaucracy at Weber or if representativeness is considered more valuable legislatively than bureaucratically or even if the notion of diversity law is infrequently studied cross-nationally, it is uncertain. Moreover, my data indicate that more women are serving in central government and even sub-national government in many cases than they are in parliaments. The implications of these trends remain unstudied. Despite this conclusion, with there is no international agreement behind an idea, there is no data collection. Just fifteen years ago, the idea that “governance” mattered for economic development was not broadly accepted within development circles. Today, you cannot read an article about international development without some mention of a project, agency or national governance structure, function, process or interaction. Data discussing various aspects of governance, including its effectiveness and efficiency are found nearly everywhere. Discussion about its representativeness is not. This is a problem that requires more practical and theoretical highlighting.

The paper indicates that across countries there is a clear preference for women to encompass a larger percentage of the sub-national workforce than at the national levels. This observation, while noticed within the U.S.-based literature, requires further international attention. Its parallel with studies on the legislative branches in federalized countries may provide an additional avenue of study. Considering these outcomes from a social perspective, what is it about local or state/provincial civil servant positions

that are more appealing to females? Is it a question of policy impact? Do women feel that have more impact within their home regions as opposed to working at the national levels? Or perhaps it is a question of family. Is it because civil service jobs are closer to the home that women feel more able to work within the sub-national level public services? Or maybe it is about job stature. Are the civil service jobs within sub-national governments more likely to have administrative roles, roles that women are more likely to fill? Or perhaps there is even a linkage between female parliamentarians and job opportunities for women within the civil service? Or that local level agencies tend to be more human and social service oriented and thus, attract more women employees?

More specific to the representative bureaucracy literature in the United States, none of the available cross-national data is able to even being to answer many of the questions currently researched within representative bureaucracy. Does the passive representation that I profiled in this paper lead to active representation? When and where might this linkage be made? Looking at the national and sub-national agency leadership, do we find more male agency heads at the national level than the state or local levels and thus, more men than women working within the national level agencies? These questions required further in-country research for the answers to be found.

And finally and perhaps more relevant for this paper, do levels of representative bureaucracy vary across cultures or over time? Does the premise that there is no politics-administration dichotomy have to hold before representative bureaucracy considered a valid concept on its own? If indeed, there is a dichotomy then it may matter little how representative our bureaucracies are or are not. What about cultures where bureaucratic positions are held in high regard and are given only to the very best students? Would those countries still value representativeness over some measure of intelligence or fit? What about the opposite scenario? In countries where bureaucratic jobs are generally considered the least desirable, would that impact representativeness? Would countries where bureaucratic jobs are given out by political leaders to ensure political stability or support have different results from the other type of countries? Looking more structurally, do societies with high ratios of executive to legislative power view representativeness differently from those where the legislative branches hold significant power?

These are just some of the questions that can be raised when one undertakes cross-national research on representative bureaucracy. It forces scholars and policymakers not only to think about others outside our country, but perhaps in an ironic twist, to think more about ourselves as well. Is the United States unique? Seemingly not when we can also find women are more likely to be employed at the sub-national as opposed to the national levels. There is clearly something causing this cross-national observation to exist. Moreover, the fact that national income matters for seeking civil service employment is intriguing. The implication may be that in poorer countries formal sector jobs are few and far between and thus, tend to be reserved for men or more generally, for the gender with the highest literacy rate, which is also tends men. For countries currently considered underdeveloped, excluding women from civil service jobs and thus, out of the national policy conservations, may be assisting in the country's continued underdevelopment. If we believe that civil servants are not Weberian implementers, the civil services run by, and controlled by, men may be less likely to solicit or understand the viewpoint of one half of their society. As the first of its kind, this paper is far from providing any answers. However, it is hopefully an early step toward discussing Milton Esman's observation about the positive linkages among representative bureaucracy, government legitimacy and international development.

Table 1: Percentage of Female Civil Servants at the National and Sub-National Levels (United States)

| Year | Percent (%) of Female Civil Servants | |
|---------|--------------------------------------|-------------------------|
| | Central Government | Sub-National Government |
| 1996 | 43.8% | 57.4% |
| 1997 | 44.2% | 57.8% |
| 1998 | 42.7% | 58.2% |
| 1999 | 42.4% | 58.6% |
| 2000 | 43.0% | 58.8% |
| 2001 | 41.5% | 59.2% |
| 2002 | 41.8% | 59.6% |
| 2003 | 42.5% | 59.3% |
| 2004 | 42.8% | 59.1% |
| 2005 | N/A | N/A |
| Average | 42.7% | 58.7% |

Table 2: Values for Each Variable (United States Only)

| Variable | United States Only |
|----------------------------|--------------------|
| % Women (Central) | 42.7 |
| % Women (Sub-National) | 58.7 |
| Fiscal Decentralization | 46.982 |
| Voice & Accountability | 1.261 |
| GDP per capita (US\$ 2000) | \$ 32,788 |
| % Female Parliamentarians | 13.467 |

Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for All Available Data Points

| All Variables | | | | | | |
|---------------|-----------|----------|----------|--------|-----------|--|
| Obs | Countries | Mean | Std. Dev | Min | Max | |
| 476 | 87 | 41.216 | 12.104 | 8.333 | 67.592 | |
| 178 | 32 | 50.357 | 21.163 | 11.111 | 84.211 | |
| 389 | 68 | 23.697 | 14.129 | 1.764 | 58.730 | |
| 1361 | 204 | -0.032 | 1.005 | -2.379 | 1.712 | |
| 2446 | 182 | \$ 5,710 | \$ 8,681 | \$ 57 | \$ 49,980 | |
| 1415 | 178 | 13.014 | 8.858 | 0.300 | 49.000 | |

Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for All Available Data Points (Central Government Models Only)

| Central Government Model (Maximum Available) | | | | | | |
|--|-----------|----------|-----------|--------|-----------|----|
| Obs | Countries | Mean | Std. Dev | Min | Max | |
| -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 247 | -- | 23.213 | 14.176 | 2.444 | 55.619 | |
| 444 | -- | 0.409 | 0.837 | -2.020 | 1.712 | |
| 303 | -- | \$ 8,227 | \$ 10,258 | \$ 114 | \$ 44,758 | |
| 1415 | -- | 14.554 | 10.194 | 1.000 | 45.000 | |

Table 5: Descriptive Statistics for All Available Data Points (Sub-National Government Models Only)

| Sub-National Government Model (Maximum Available) | | | | | | |
|---|-----------|-----------|-----------|--------|-----------|----|
| Obs | Countries | Mean | Std. Dev | Min | Max | |
| -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 66 | -- | 28.455 | 15.602 | 2.444 | 55.619 | |
| 93 | -- | 0.895 | 0.729 | -1.358 | 1.712 | |
| 172 | -- | \$ 14,678 | \$ 12,865 | \$ 114 | \$ 44,758 | |
| 125 | -- | 20.976 | 12.884 | 2.000 | 45.000 | |

Table 6: C1 Model, Descriptive Statistics

| Central Government Model (C1) (With Fiscal Decentralization, No Parliament) | | | | | | |
|--|-----------|-----------|-----------|--------|-----------|--|
| Obs | Countries | Mean | Std. Dev | Min | Max | |
| 50 | 30 | 43.817 | 11.606 | 8.333 | 66.605 | |
| 50 | 30 | 24.286 | 14.777 | 2.773 | 55.619 | |
| 50 | 30 | 0.696 | 0.771 | -1.358 | 1.712 | |
| 50 | 30 | \$ 10,789 | \$ 11,251 | \$ 394 | \$ 35,855 | |
| 50 | 30 | -- | -- | -- | -- | |

Table 7: C2 Model, Descriptive Statistics

| Central Government Model (C2) (With Fiscal Mean, No Parliament) | | | | | | |
|--|-----------|----------|-----------|--------|-----------|--|
| Obs | Countries | Mean | Std. Dev | Min | Max | |
| 163 | 40 | 44.792 | 11.500 | 8.333 | 66.605 | |
| 163 | 40 | 21.404 | 14.109 | 2.194 | 54.843 | |
| 163 | 40 | 0.679 | 0.683 | -1.358 | 1.712 | |
| 163 | 40 | \$ 9,590 | \$ 11,226 | \$ 394 | \$ 44,757 | |
| 163 | 40 | -- | -- | -- | -- | |

Table 8: C3 Model, Descriptive Statistics

| Central Government Model (C3) (With Fiscal Mean & Female Parliamentarians) | | | | | | |
|---|-----------|-----------|-----------|--------|-----------|--|
| Obs | Countries | Mean | Std. Dev | Min | Max | |
| 128 | 37 | 45.498 | 11.598 | 8.682 | 66.605 | |
| 128 | 37 | 21.641 | 13.879 | 2.194 | 48.018 | |
| 128 | 37 | 0.740 | 0.639 | -1.036 | 1.703 | |
| 128 | 37 | \$ 10,260 | \$ 11,676 | \$ 422 | \$ 44,758 | |
| 128 | 37 | 17.516 | 10.719 | 3.000 | 45.000 | |

Table 9: SN1 Model, Descriptive Statistics

| Sub-National Government Model (SN1) (With Fiscal Decentralization, No Parliament) | | | | | | |
|--|-----------|-----------|-----------|--------|-----------|----|
| Obs | Countries | Mean | Std. Dev | Min | Max | |
| 28 | 17 | 54.768 | 23.751 | 11.594 | 83.942 | |
| 28 | 17 | 29.281 | 16.227 | 2.773 | 55.619 | |
| 28 | 17 | 0.998 | 0.745 | -1.358 | 1.712 | |
| 28 | 17 | \$ 16,031 | \$ 12,452 | \$ 394 | \$ 35,855 | |
| 28 | 17 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |

Table 10: SN2 Model, Descriptive Statistics

| Sub-National Government Model (SN2) (With Fiscal Mean, No Parliament) | | | | | | |
|--|-----------|-----------|-----------|--------|-----------|----|
| Obs | Countries | Mean | Std. Dev | Min | Max | |
| 87 | 24 | 53.489 | 21.540 | 11.594 | 83.942 | |
| 87 | 24 | 28.091 | 14.449 | 2.991 | 54.843 | |
| 87 | 24 | 0.984 | 0.642 | -1.358 | 1.712 | |
| 87 | 24 | \$ 15,608 | \$ 13,002 | \$ 394 | \$ 44,758 | |
| 87 | 24 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |

Table 11: SN3 Model, Descriptive Statistics

| Sub-National Government Model (SN3) (With Fiscal Mean & Female Parliamentarians) | | | | | | |
|---|-----------|-----------|-----------|--------|-----------|--|
| Obs | Countries | Mean | Std. Dev | Min | Max | |
| 68 | 22 | 55.56 | 20.459 | 14.035 | 83.217 | |
| 68 | 22 | 28.591 | 13.861 | 2.991 | 48.018 | |
| 68 | 22 | 1.078 | 0.511 | -0.472 | 1.703 | |
| 68 | 22 | \$ 17,010 | \$ 13,152 | \$ 422 | \$ 44,758 | |
| 68 | 22 | 22.206 | 13.049 | 5.000 | 45.000 | |

Table 12: Central Government Results (Panel-Corrected Time Series)

| Variables | Central Government Models | | |
|----------------------------------|--|----------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| | <i>Model C1</i> | <i>Model C2</i> | <i>Model C3</i> |
| | <i>Fiscal Decentralization No Parliament</i> | <i>Fiscal Mean No Parliament</i> | <i>Fiscal Mean With Parliament</i> |
| | Coefficient (Standard Error) | Coefficient (Standard Error) | Coefficient (Standard Error) |
| Fiscal Decentralization | -0.003*** (0.001) | -0.004*** (0.001) | -0.004*** (0.001) |
| Voice & Accountability | -0.006 (0.023) | 0.022 (0.168) | 0.011 (0.023) |
| GDP per capita (US\$)(2000)(log) | 0.041** (0.120) | 0.055*** (0.015) | 0.030* (0.017) |
| % Women Parliament (log) | -- -- | -- -- | 0.023* (0.013) |
| Observations | 50 | 163 | 128 |
| Countries | 30 | 40 | 37 |

* P < 0.1, ** P < 0.05, *** P < 0.01

Table 13: Sub-National Government Models (Panel-Corrected Time Series)

| Variables | Coefficient (Standard Error) | Coefficient (Standard Error) | Coefficient (Standard Error) |
|----------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Fiscal Decentralization | -0.000 (0.003) | 0.003 (0.002) | 0.002 (0.003) |
| Voice & Accountability | -0.016 (0.027) | 0.022 (0.036) | -0.016 (0.016) |
| GDP per capita (US\$)(2000)(log) | 0.112*** (0.025) | 0.087*** (0.001) | 0.132** (0.052) |
| % Women Parliament (log) | -- -- | -- -- | -0.063 (0.039) |
| Observations | 28 | 87 | 68 |
| Countries | 17 | 24 | 22 |

* P < 0.1, ** P < 0.05, *** P < 0.01. Sub-National Model Standard Errors are Robust Standard Errors. The P-value for % Women Parliament was 0.106, close to the 90% mark.

Table 14: Countries Included in Models, By Income Category

| | World | Central Government Models | | | Sub-National Government Models | | |
|-------------------------------|--------------|---------------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------------------------|--------------|--------------|
| | Bank | C1 | C2 | C3 | SN1 | SN2 | SN3 |
| Low Income Countries | 54 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| <i>% of Total:</i> | <i>26.0%</i> | <i>3.3%</i> | <i>2.5%</i> | <i>2.7%</i> | <i>5.9%</i> | <i>4.2%</i> | <i>4.5%</i> |
| Lower-Middle Income Countries | 58 | 5 | 9 | 7 | 2 | 4 | 2 |
| <i>% of Total:</i> | <i>27.9%</i> | <i>16.7%</i> | <i>22.5%</i> | <i>18.9%</i> | <i>11.8%</i> | <i>16.7%</i> | <i>9.1%</i> |
| Upper-Middle Income Countries | 40 | 12 | 16 | 16 | 4 | 6 | 6 |
| <i>% of Total:</i> | <i>19.2%</i> | <i>40.0%</i> | <i>40.0%</i> | <i>43.2%</i> | <i>23.5%</i> | <i>25.0%</i> | <i>27.3%</i> |
| High Income Countries | 56 | 12 | 14 | 13 | 10 | 13 | 13 |
| <i>% of Total:</i> | <i>26.9%</i> | <i>40.0%</i> | <i>35.0%</i> | <i>35.1%</i> | <i>58.8%</i> | <i>54.2%</i> | <i>59.1%</i> |
| Total: | 208 | 30 | 40 | 37 | 17 | 24 | 22 |

Table 15: Countries Included in Models

| Models | Countries in Models | | | |
|---------------------------------------|---------------------|---|---|--|
| | Low Income | Lower-Middle Income | Upper-Middle | High Income |
| <i>Central Government Models</i> | | | | |
| Model C1 | India | Albania, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, China, Thailand | Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mauritius, Poland, Romania, Uruguay | Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, New Zealand, Norway, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United States |
| Model C2 | India | Albania, Azerbaijan, Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Fiji, Paraguay, Philippines, Thailand | Argentina, Botswana, Chile, Costa Rica, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mauritius, Panama, Poland, Romania, Russia, Uruguay | Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United States |
| Model C3 | India | Albania, Azerbaijan, Brazil, Bulgaria, Paraguay, Philippines, Thailand | Argentina, Botswana, Chile, Costa Rica, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mauritius, Panama, Poland, Romania, Russia, Uruguay | Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United States |
| <i>Sub-National Government Models</i> | | | | |

| | | | | |
|-----------|-------|---------------------------------|--|---|
| Model SN1 | India | Albania, China | Costa Rica, Latvia, Malaysia, Mauritius | Denmark, Finland, Germany, New Zealand, Norway, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United States Denmark, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United States |
| Model SN2 | India | Albania, Brazil, China, Fiji | Botswana, Costa Rica, Latvia, Malaysia, Mauritius, Russia | Denmark, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United States |
| Model SN3 | India | Albania, China | Botswana, Costa Rica, Latvia, Malaysia, Mauritius, Russia | Denmark, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United States |

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ⁱ Following the Meier, Wrinkle & Polinard article, a debate ensued about their methodological approach (Meier, Eller, Wrinkle, & Polinard, 2001; Nielsen & Wolf, 2000).

ⁱⁱ Another potential reason cannot be ignored. Via its founding articles, one of the most powerful international financial institutions, the World Bank, is not allowed to engage in overt political advising. Of course, anti-Bank activists might argue that everything the Bank does is political and for the purposes of this paper one could envision that encouraging representativeness is akin to political advising. While encouraging representative bureaucracy

might be linked to the Bank's broader objectives of encouraging broad-based legitimacy, it is suspected by this author that the efficiency-first objectives that parlay into its neoliberal framework and their understanding of bureaucrats as essentially Weberian providers of policy directives are more important than any worry about the perceived politicization of the World Bank's policy advice.

ⁱⁱⁱ Between 1951 and 1962, the UN, USAID, and the Ford Foundation spent nearly \$250 million on administrative reform. This money "supported some seventy-five training institutions and trained at least seven thousand persons in public administration" (Braibanti, 1970).

^{iv} Political (also called electoral) decentralization is number of jurisdictions at the sub-national level. These jurisdictions may or may not have an elected leader. These jurisdictions are presumed to have a civil service, even if just one or two staff. The World Bank defines administrative decentralization as seeking to "redistribute authority, responsibility and financial resources for providing public services among different levels of government" (WorldBank, n.d.-a).

^v Units of analysis included particular central government (federal) agencies (Hindera, 1993; Meier & Nigro, 1976; Naff, 2001; Soni, 2000), states (Barnett, Baron, & Smart, 2000; Keiser, Wilkins, Meier, & Holland, 2002; Meier & Stewart Jr, 1992) and cities (Eisinger, 1982; Miller, Kerr, & Reid, 1999; Slack, 1987).

^{vi} What is considered "public sector" varies by country (Hammouya, 1999). The ILO cautions that there are not all countries use the same definitions of public sector and that the use of these definitions by countries can vary over time. Definitions of public sector used in this paper (depending upon data availability) can include the military services and state-owned enterprises.

^{vii} The ILO's LABORSTA database did not provide gendered civil service data for either Russia or South Korea at the central and sub-national levels. Instead, this data was added to my database through the following two articles: (Brym & Gimpelson, 2004) for Russia, and (Kim & Yoon, 1996) for South Korea.

^{viii} An earlier version of this paper used only an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model. However, a more appropriate methodological response to these data limitations is to employ a panel-corrected time series regression, which is the methodology of this paper.

^{ix} Since the voice and accountability index has data only for 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002-2004, the maximum number of data points possible per country is six.

^x The mean value for the United States is included for comparison purposes since the majority of representative bureaucracy literature is based on a case study of one.

^{xi} It should be noted that just because there is a break in years it could mean either the ratios changed in the opposite direction, or more likely, that data is missing for one or more years.